相关论文: Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Ordinal Pre…

The research field of automated negotiation has a long history of designing agents that can negotiate with other agents. Such negotiation strategies are traditionally based on manual design and heuristics. More recently, reinforcement…

We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order…

The problem of achieving common understanding between agents that use different vocabularies has been mainly addressed by designing techniques that explicitly negotiate mappings between their vocabularies, requiring agents to share a…

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…

The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with…

It is well established that humans decision making and instrumental control uses multiple systems, some which use habitual action selection and some which require deliberate planning. Deliberate planning systems use predictions of…

Despite abundant negotiation strategies in literature, the complexity of automated negotiation forbids a single strategy from being dominant against all others in different negotiation scenarios. To overcome this, one approach is to use…

Standard ordinal allocation methods ignore how strongly agents value different improvements, while cardinal methods require additional assumptions that are often considered too demanding. This paper studies assignment problems in the middle…

Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In…

We introduce a model of negotiation dynamics whose aim is that of mimicking the mechanisms leading to opinion and convention formation in a population of individuals. The negotiation process, as opposed to ``herding-like'' or ``bounded…

We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…

We study a ubiquitous learning challenge in online principal-agent problems during which the principal learns the agent's private information from the agent's revealed preferences in historical interactions. This paradigm includes important…

In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…

In current presence or availability systems, the method of presenting a user's state often supposes an instantaneous notion of that state - for example, a visualization is rendered or an inference is made about the potential actions that…

This paper maps out the relation between different approaches for handling preferences in argumentation with strict rules and defeasible assumptions by offering translations between them. The systems we compare are: non-prioritized defeats…

Achieving consensus among noncooperative agents remains challenging in decentralized multi-agent systems, where agents often have conflicting preferences. Existing coordination methods enable agents to reach consensus without a centralized…

We study the problem of option pricing and hedging strategies within the frame-work of risk-return arguments. An economic agent is described by a utility function that depends on profit (an expected value) and risk (a variance). In the…

Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has received little attention here so far. In this setting, the agents…

A principal contracts with an agent through an informed delegate. Although the principal cannot directly mediate the interaction, she can restrict the menus of contracts the delegate may offer. We characterize the outcomes implementable…

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…