相关论文: Individual and Group Stability in Neutral Restrict…

An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively…

In coalition formation games self-organized coalitions are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent agents. For each couple of agents $(i,j)$, weight $w_{i,j}=w_{j,i}$ reflects how much agents $i$ and $j$ benefit…

We initiate the study of control in hedonic games, where an external actor influences coalition formation by adding or deleting agents. We consider three basic control goals (1) enforcing that an agent is not alone (NA); (2) enforcing that…

We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the…

Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents…

Hedonic games are fundamental models for investigating the formation of coalitions among a set of strategic agents, where every agent has a certain utility for every possible coalition of agents it can be part of. To avoid the…

Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…

We study PAC learnability and PAC stabilizability of Hedonic Games (HGs), i.e., efficiently inferring preferences or core-stable partitions from samples. We first expand the known learnability/stabilizability landscape for some of the most…

We study coalition formation in the framework of hedonic games. There, a set of agents needs to be partitioned into disjoint coalitions, where agents have a preference order over coalitions. A partition is called popular if it does not lose…

We introduce friend- and enemy-oriented hedonic games with strangers (FOHGS and EOHGS respectively), two classes of hedonic games wherein agents are classified as friends, enemies, or strangers under the assumption that strangers will…

Hedonic games formalize coalition formation scenarios where players evaluate an outcome based on the coalition they are contained in. Due to a large number of possible coalitions, compact representations of these games are crucial. We…

We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition.…

Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a variant of additively separable hedonic games where agents…

A community needs to be partitioned into disjoint groups; each community member has an underlying preference over the groups that they would want to be a member of. We are interested in finding a stable community structure: one where no…

We study stability in additively separable hedonic games when coalition sizes have to respect fixed size bounds. We consider four classic notions of stability based on single-agent deviations, namely, Nash stability, individual stability,…

Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…

Hedonic games are a prominent model of coalition formation, in which each agent's utility only depends on the coalition she resides. The subclass of hedonic games that models the formation of general partnerships, where output is shared…

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this…

The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…

In hedonic diversity games (HDGs), recently introduced by Bredereck, Elkind and Igarashi (2019), each agent belongs to one of two classes (men and women, vegetarians and meat-eaters, junior and senior researchers), and agents' preferences…