相关论文: Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities

We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any…

Due to its theoretical virtues, several recent works propose the use of the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for electricity markets. Coalitions of participants, however, can influence the VCG outcome to obtain…

Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…

The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In \cite{McL11}, McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even if we consider…

We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function f of $q \ge 4$ alternatives and n voters will be manipulable with probability at least…

We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal…

To address the demand of exponentially increasing end users efficient use of limited spectrum is a necessity. For this, spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum band is required to cater to the…

We evaluate the applicability of the generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating a portfolio of generating units at the centralized two-settlement…

Device-to-Device communication allows a cellular user (relay node) to relay data between the base station (BS) and another cellular user (destination node). We address the problem of designing reverse auctions to assign a relay node to each…

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…

In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…

We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…

This paper introduces the distributionally robust random utility model (DRO-RUM), which allows the preference shock (unobserved heterogeneity) distribution to be misspecified or unknown. We make three contributions using tools from the…

In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can be used…

We study balanced exchange problems in which agents with responsive preferences are endowed with multiple indivisible objects and can trade without transfers (e.g. shift exchange, time-banking). Eliciting full preferences over bundles is…

Serial dictatorship is a simple mechanism for coordinating agents in solving combinatorial optimization problems according to their preferences. The most representative such problem is one-sided matching, in which a set of n agents have…

Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the available alternatives and outputs a committee of…

We study the design of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms satisfying participation constraints in the job-matching problem. Each firm can hire multiple workers and each worker can be employed at only one firm. While firm utilities over…

A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…

An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…