序贯机制设计
计算机科学与博弈论
2016-08-14 v1
摘要
在传统的 VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) 机制中，说真话是一个占优策略。在本文中，我们研究序贯 VCG 机制，并表明此时可能存在其他占优策略。我们通过涉及 Clarke 税和公共项目的例子，说明了如何利用这一事实来最小化税收。
引用
@article{arxiv.0705.2170,
title = {Sequential mechanism design},
author = {Krzysztof R. Apt and Arantza Estévez-Fernández},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0705.2170},
year = {2016}
}
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28 pages
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