相关论文: On the parameterized complexity of manipulating To…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.…
We study the Maximum Budgeted Allocation problem, i.e., the problem of selling a set of $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ players, each with a separate budget, such that we maximize the collected revenue. Since the natural assignment LP is known…
We consider the task of allocating indivisible items to agents, when the agents' preferences over the items are identical. The preferences are captured by means of a directed acyclic graph, with vertices representing items and an edge…
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable…
In this paper we study the problem of finding a small safe set $S$ in a graph $G$, i.e. a non-empty set of vertices such that no connected component of $G[S]$ is adjacent to a larger component in $G - S$. We enhance our understanding of the…
Classic no-trade theorems attribute trade to heterogeneous beliefs. We re-examine this conclusion for AI agents, asking if trade can arise from computational limitations, under common beliefs. We model agents' bounded computational…
Shifted combinatorial optimization is a new nonlinear optimization framework which is a broad extension of standard combinatorial optimization, involving the choice of several feasible solutions at a time. This framework captures well…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are located on a line to multiple agents. A feasible allocation requires that the allocated items to each agent are connected on the line. The…
We study the complexity of the Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DCSP) on a synchronous, anonymous network from a theoretical standpoint. In this setting, variables and constraints are controlled by agents which communicate with…
Consider an exchange mechanism which accepts diversified offers of various commodities and redistributes everything it receives. We impose certain conditions of fairness and convenience on such a mechanism and show that it admits unique…
Symmetry is a common feature of many combinatorial problems. Unfortunately eliminating all symmetry from a problem is often computationally intractable. This paper argues that recent parameterized complexity results provide insight into…
The Set Packing problem is, given a collection of sets $\mathcal{S}$ over a ground set $\mathcal{U}$, to find a maximum collection of sets that are pairwise disjoint. The problem is among the most fundamental NP-hard optimization problems…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model,…
An upper dominating set is a minimal dominating set in a graph. In the \textsc{Upper Dominating Set} problem, the goal is to find an upper dominating set of maximum size. We study the complexity of parameterized algorithms for \textsc{Upper…
Real-life agents seldom have unlimited reasoning power. In this paper, we propose and study a new formal notion of computationally bounded strategic ability in multi-agent systems. The notion characterizes the ability of a set of agents to…
Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. Coalitions enable agents to achieve goals that they may not have been able to achieve on their own. Previous work has shown problems in coalitional games to be computationally hard.…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…