相关论文: The Power Allocation Game on A Network: A Paradox
Varied real world systems such as transportation networks, supply chains and energy grids present coordination problems where many agents must learn to share resources. It is well known that the independent and selfish interactions of…
The ongoing energy transition requires power grid extensions to connect renewable generators to consumers and to transfer power among distant areas. The process of grid extension requires a large investment of resources and is supposed to…
Braess's paradox -- where adding network capacity increases travel time -- is typically attributed to selfish agents. Although eusocial colonies maximize collective fitness, we find experimentally that \emph{Diacamma indicum} ants exhibit…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
The travel costs of the players (travelers) in anonymous congestion games depend on their choices of routes and also on the states of the transportation network such as incidents, weather, and road work. In this extended abstract, we…
Braess \cite{1} has been studied about a traffic flow on a diamond type network and found that introducing new edges to the networks always does not achieve the efficiency. Some researchers studied the Braess' paradox in similar type…
Route controlled autonomous vehicles could have a significant impact in reducing congestion in the future. Before applying multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms to route control, we can model the system using a congestion game to…
This paper studies a special kind of equilibrium termed as "balanced equilibrium" which arises in the power allocation game defined in \cite{allocation}. In equilibrium, each country in antagonism has to use all of its own power to…
The Informational Braess' Paradox (IBP) illustrates a counterintuitive scenario where revelation of additional roadway segments to some self-interested travelers leads to increased travel times for these individuals. IBP extends the…
To systematically study the implications of additional information about routes provided to certain users (e.g., via GPS-based route guidance systems), we introduce a new class of congestion games in which users have differing information…
In this paper we investigate the impact of path additions to transport networks with optimised traffic routing. In particular, we study the behaviour of total travel time, and consider both self-interested routing paradigms, such as User…
Multiplex networks are representations of multilayer interconnected complex networks where the nodes are the same at every layer. They turn out to be good abstractions of the intricate connectivity of multimodal transportation networks,…
The emergence of the Braess' paradox in road traffic systems demonstrates the positive effect of transportation planning in improving efficiency. By contrast, the phenomenon has rarely been examined in pedestrian evacuation traffic. Yet the…
This work explores the relationship between the set of Wardrop equilibria~(WE) of a routing game, the total demand of that game, and the occurrence of Braess's paradox~(BP). The BP formalizes the counter-intuitive fact that for some…
We study traffic networks with multiple origin-destination pairs, relaxing the simplifying assumption of agents having complete knowledge of the network structure. We identify a ubiquitous class of networks, i.e., rings, for which we can…
This article studies the value of information in route choice decisions when a fraction of players have access to high accuracy information about traffic incidents relative to others. To model such environments, we introduce a Bayesian…
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We…
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…
In the stochastic exploration of geometrically embedded graphs, intuition suggests that providing a shortcut between a pair of nodes reduces the mean first passage time of the entire graph. Counterintuitively, we find a Braess paradox…
Reliable functioning of supply and transport networks fundamentally support many non-equilibrium dynamical systems, from biological organisms and ecosystems to human-made water, gas, heat, electricity and traffic networks. Strengthening an…