相关论文: Deviator Detection under Imperfect Monitoring

We study stochastic static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers, with the goal of obtaining (globally) optimal policies under a decentralized information structure. We present sufficient conditions to connect the concepts…

This paper contains a reformulation of any $n$-player finite, static game into a framework of distributed, dynamical system based on agents' payoff-based deviations. The reformulation generalizes the method employed in the second part of…

Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one's own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or…

Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, opponent responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss…

Petri games are a multi-player game model for the automatic synthesis of distributed systems, where the players are represented as tokens on a Petri net and are grouped into environment players and system players. As long as the players…

A team consisting of an unknown number of mobile agents, starting from different nodes of an unknown network, possibly at different times, have to meet at the same node. Agents are anonymous (identical), execute the same deterministic…

We study a repeated sender-receiver game where inspections are public but the sender's action is hidden unless inspected. A detected deception ends the relationship or triggers a finite punishment. We show the public state is one…

The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…

Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…

In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…

We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…

Understanding the neural mechanisms responsible for human social interactions is difficult, since the brain activities of two or more individuals have to be examined simultaneously and correlated with the observed social patterns. We…

Often adaptive, distributed control can be viewed as an iterated game between independent players. The coupling between the players' mixed strategies, arising as the system evolves from one instant to the next, is determined by the system…

Deceptive patterns are often used in interface design to manipulate users into taking actions they would not otherwise take, such as consenting to excessive data collection. We present Trickery, a narrative serious game that incorporates…

Revealing the interaction topology underlying strategic behavior is fundamental to prediction, intervention, and policy design in networked systems. Yet the interaction matrix is often unobservable, and passive observation of repeated…

In this paper, we revisit the two-player continuous-time infinite-horizon linear quadratic differential game problem, where one of the players can sample the state of the system only intermittently due to a sensing constraint while the…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

Consider a two-person zero-sum search game between a hider and a searcher. The hider hides among $n$ discrete locations, and the searcher successively visits individual locations until finding the hider. Known to both players, a search at…

Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…

This paper studies pipelined algorithms for protecting distributed grid computations from cheating participants, who wish to be rewarded for tasks they receive but don't perform. We present improved cheater detection algorithms that utilize…