相关论文: Communication Complexity of Discrete Fair Division

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of…

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items with subsidies when agents have weighted entitlements. After highlighting several important differences from the unweighted case, we present several results concerning weighted…

We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…

We study how to fairly allocate a set of indivisible chores to a group of agents, where each agent $i$ has a non-negative weight $w_i$ that represents its obligation for undertaking the chores. We consider the fairness notion of weighted…

We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their…

Recent discussion in the public sphere about algorithmic classification has involved tension between competing notions of what it means for a probabilistic classification to be fair to different groups. We formalize three fairness…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…

We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered "easy": multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial…

In fair division problems, we are given a set $S$ of $m$ items and a set $N$ of $n$ agents with individual preferences, and the goal is to find an allocation of items among agents so that each agent finds the allocation fair. There are…

A \emph{fair competition}, based on the concept of envy-freeness, is a non-eliminating competition where each contestant (team or individual player) may not play against all other contestants, but the total difficulty for each contestant is…

We present a general framework for proving polynomial sample complexity bounds for the problem of learning from samples the best auction in a class of "simple" auctions. Our framework captures all of the most prominent examples of "simple"…

In this paper, we focus on how to dynamically allocate a divisible resource fairly among n players who arrive and depart over time. The players may have general heterogeneous valuations over the resource. It is known that the exact…

We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with bidders from either a standard valuation class (which require exponential communication to explicitly state, such as subadditive or XOS), or…

We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each item. We, thus, make a distinction between items that are good…

We study a discrete fair division problem where $n$ agents have additive valuation functions over a set of $m$ goods. We focus on the well-known $\alpha$-EFX fairness criterion, according to which the envy of an agent for another agent is…

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For…

Fair allocation has been studied intensively in both economics and computer science, and fair sharing of resources has aroused renewed interest with the advent of virtualization and cloud computing. Prior work has typically focused on…

We study a model of communication complexity that encompasses many well-studied problems, including classical and quantum communication complexity, the complexity of simulating distributions arising from bipartite measurements of shared…

We consider two models of fair division with indivisible items: one for goods and one for bads. For goods, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (EF1 and EFX for goods) and three common welfare (utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash)…

Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…