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In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

We investigate the problem of obtaining agreement protocols in the presence of a mobile adversary, who can control an ever-changing selection of processors. We make improvements to previous results for the case when the communications…

The event-triggered control problem over lossy communication networks is addressed in this paper. Although packet dropouts have been considered in the implementation of event-triggered controllers, the assumption of protocols that employ…

The spread of disinformation poses a significant threat to societal well-being. We analyze this phenomenon using an evolutionary game theory model of the sender-receiver game, where senders aim to mislead receivers and receivers aim to…

We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…

In this paper, we consider contention resolution algorithms that are augmented with predictions about the network. We begin by studying the natural setup in which the algorithm is provided a distribution defined over the possible network…

The paper studies the problem of reaching agreement in a distributed message-passing system prone to crash failures. Crashes are generated by \constrained\ adversaries - a \wadapt\ adversary, who has to fix in advance the set of $f$…

This article deals with the consensus problem involving agents with time-varying singularities in the dynamics or communication in undirected graph networks. Existing results provide control laws which guarantee asymptotic consensus. These…

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…

We consider the problem of rational secret sharing introduced by Halpern and Teague [1], where the players involved in secret sharing play only if it is to their advantage. This can be characterized in the form of preferences. Players would…

The notion of \emph{policy regret} in online learning is a well defined? performance measure for the common scenario of adaptive adversaries, which more traditional quantities such as external regret do not take into account. We revisit the…

We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. By adopting a rather strict definition of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes only - we can show that every strictly correct quantum protocol…

This article studies distributed event-triggered consensus over unreliable communication channels. Communication is unreliable in the sense that the broadcast channel from one agent to its neighbors can drop the event-triggered packets of…

In this brief paper, a new consensus protocol based on the sign of innovations is proposed. Based on this protocol each agent only requires single-bit of information about its relative state to its neighboring agents. This is significant in…

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…

In this paper, we introduce the notion of Plausible Deniability in an information theoretic framework. We consider a scenario where an entity that eavesdrops through a broadcast channel summons one of the parties in a communication protocol…

We consider $k$-resilient sequential equilibria, strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most $k$ players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, regardless of its local state. We prove that all $k$-resilient…

The problem of consensus in the presence of adversarially behaving agents has been studied extensively in the literature. The proposed algorithms typically guarantee that the consensus value lies within the convex hull of initial normal…

We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be…

In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a…