相关论文: A 3-player protocol preventing persistence in stra…

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…

We consider \emph{plurality consensus} in a network of $n$ nodes. Initially, each node has one of $k$ opinions. The nodes execute a (randomized) distributed protocol to agree on the plurality opinion (the opinion initially supported by the…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

Concurrent parameterized games involve a fixed yet arbitrary number of players. They are described by finite arenas in which the edges are labeled with languages that describe the possible move combinations leading from one vertex to…

We consider the following distributed consensus problem: Each node in a complete communication network of size $n$ initially holds an \emph{opinion}, which is chosen arbitrarily from a finite set $\Sigma$. The system must converge toward a…

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver's utility.…

An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…

In this technical report, we analyze the performance of an interference-aware opportunistic relay selection protocol for multi-hop line networks which is based on the following simple rule: a node always transmits if it has a packet, except…

We consider a population of $n$ agents which communicate with each other in a decentralized manner, through random pairwise interactions. One or more agents in the population may act as authoritative sources of information, and the…

Consensus networks are widely deployed in numerous civil and industrial applications. However, the process of reaching a common consensus among nodes can unintentionally reveal the network's topology to external observers by appropriate…

The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems, and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Consequently, using such an agent involves the user exposing themselves to the risk that the…

We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the sole assumption of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes - we show that every protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive…

Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying graph G repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma against their neighbors. The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their opponents by applying the so-called…

We consider selfish sources that send updates to a monitor over a shared wireless access. The sources would like to minimize the age of their information at the monitor. Our goal is to devise strategies that incentivize such sources to use…

We study a discrete-time model where each packet has a cost of not being sent -- this cost might depend on the packet content. We study the tradeoff between the age and the cost where the sender is confined to packet-based strategies. The…

Commitments play a crucial role in game theory, shaping strategic interactions by either altering a player's own payoffs or influencing the incentives of others through outcome-contingent payments. While most research has focused on using…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We study a referential game (a type of signaling game) where two agents communicate with each other via a discrete bottleneck to achieve a common goal. In our referential game, the goal of the speaker is to compose a message or a symbolic…

This paper investigates the implementation and performance of a decentralized information transmission mechanism in game with complete or incomplete games. We propose a mechanism that realizes irrational correlated equilibria or irrational…

We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…