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Concurrent multi-player games with $\omega$-regular objectives are a standard model for systems that consist of several interacting components, each with its own objective. The standard solution concept for such games is Nash Equilibrium,…

Distributed consensus protocols reach agreement among $n$ players in the presence of $f$ adversaries; different protocols support different values of $f$. Existing works study this problem for different adversary types (captured by threat…

Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered…

Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…

This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…

Communication is a crucial ingredient in every kind of collaborative work. But what is the least possible amount of communication required for a given task? We formalize this question by introducing a new framework for distributed…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

We introduce a three-player nonlocal game, with a finite number of classical questions and answers, such that the optimal success probability of $1$ in the game can only be achieved in the limit of strategies using arbitrarily…

We present an efficient reduction that converts any machine learning algorithm into an interactive protocol, enabling collaboration with another party (e.g., a human) to achieve consensus on predictions and improve accuracy. This approach…

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender…

Pavlov, a well-known strategy in game theory, has been shown to have some advantages in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. However, this strategy can be exploited by inveterate defectors. We modify this strategy to mitigate the…

The congestion control algorithm of TCP relies on correct feedback from the receiver to determine the rate at which packets should be sent into the network. Hence, correct receiver feedback (in the form of TCP acknowledgements) is essential…

Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…

Our ability to know when to trust the decisions made by machine learning systems has not kept up with the staggering improvements in their performance, limiting their applicability in high-stakes domains. We introduce Prover-Verifier Games…

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…

We study timely status updates of a real-time system in an adversarial setting. The system samples a physical process, and sends the samples from the source (e.g., a sensor) to the destination (e.g, a control center) through a channel. For…

Reliable broadcast (RBC) is a key primitive in fault-tolerant distributed systems, and improving its efficiency can benefit a wide range of applications. This work focuses on signature-free RBC protocols, which are particularly attractive…

The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…