相关论文: Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency without…

We develop a general theoretical framework for optimal probability density control on standard measure spaces, aimed at addressing large-scale multi-agent control problems. In particular, we establish a maximum principle (MP) for control…

This paper considers a network of agents, where each agent is assumed to take actions optimally with respect to a predefined payoff function involving the latest actions of the agent's neighbors. Neighborhood relationships stem from payoff…

We study the combinatorial contracting problem of D\"utting et al. [FOCS '21], in which a principal seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, there is a binary outcome (the agent can succeed or fail),…

This paper studies optimal Public Private Partnerships contract between a public entity and a consortium, in continuous-time and with a continuous payment, with the possibility for the public to stop the contract. The public ("she") pays a…

Within a general semimartingale framework, we study the relationship between collective market efficiency and individual rationality. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (possibly zero-sum) exchanges among…

The recent work by Cvitani\'c, Possama\"i, and Touzi (2018) [9] presents a general approach for continuous-time principal-agent problems, through dynamic programming and second-order backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). In…

Considering that the decision-making environment faced by reinforcement learning (RL) agents is full of Knightian uncertainty, this paper describes the exploratory state dynamics equation in Knightian uncertainty to study the…

We consider a multi-agent optimal resource sharing problem that is represented by a linear program. The amount of resource to be shared is fixed, and agents belong to a population that is characterized probabilistically so as to allow…

This paper presents SIMPOL (Simplified Policy Iteration), a modular numerical framework for solving continuous-time heterogeneous agent models. The core economic problem, the optimization of consumption and savings under idiosyncratic…

In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of $n$ actions, via a linear contract. Computing the optimal contract is a…

Multi-agent systems driven by large language models (LLMs) have shown promising abilities for solving complex tasks in a collaborative manner. This work considers a fundamental problem in multi-agent collaboration: consensus seeking. When…

We study a class of cooperative multi-agent optimization problems, where each agent is associated with a local action vector and a local cost, and the goal is to cooperatively find the joint action profile that minimizes the average of the…

We study the problem of agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains. It is difficult to reach optimal agreements in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations when the agents' preferences for the possible alternatives are not common…

The agency problem emerges in today's large scale machine learning tasks, where the learners are unable to direct content creation or enforce data collection. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for aligning economic interests…

We study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the principal cannot observe the choices of the agent(s), only…

In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar results in…

This paper investigates large-population stochastic control problems in which agents share their state information and cooperate to minimize a convex cost functional. The latter is decomposed into individual and coupling costs, with the…

Social dilemmas present a significant challenge in multi-agent cooperation because individuals are incentivised to behave in ways that undermine socially optimal outcomes. Consequently, self-interested agents often avoid collective…

This paper extends the classical consumption and portfolio rules model in continuous time (Merton 1969, 1971) to the framework of decision-makers with time-inconsistent preferences. The model is solved for different utility functions for…

This paper addresses a coordination problem between two agents (Agents $1$ and $2$) in the presence of a noisy communication channel which depends on an external system state $\{x_{0,t}\}$. The channel takes as inputs both agents' actions,…