相关论文: Internalization of Externalities in Interdependent…

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…

We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…

The reliability and security of a user in an interconnected system depends on all users' collective effort in security. Consequently, investments in security technologies by strategic users is typically modeled as a public good problem,…

Malicious softwares or malwares for short have become a major security threat. While originating in criminal behavior, their impact are also influenced by the decisions of legitimate end users. Getting agents in the Internet, and in…

Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…

In a system of interdependent users, the security of an entity is affected not only by that user's investment in security measures, but also by the positive externality of the security decisions of (some of) the other users. The provision…

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…

We study the influence of degree correlations or network mixing in interdependent security. We model the interdependence in security among agents using a dependence graph and employ a population game model to capture the interaction among…

Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…

We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…

We consider team zero-sum network congestion games with $n$ agents playing against $k$ interceptors over a graph $G$. The agents aim to minimize their collective cost of sending traffic over paths in $G$, which is an aggregation of edge…

A digital security breach, by which confidential information is leaked, does not only affect the agent whose system is infiltrated, but is also detrimental to other agents socially connected to the infiltrated system. Although it has been…

How should cities invest to improve social welfare when individuals respond strategically to local conditions? We model this question using a game-theoretic version of Schelling's bounded neighbourhood model, where agents choose…

This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…

We investigate cascades in networks consisting of strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the strategic agents have choices between i) investing in protecting themselves, ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some)…

Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…

This article investigates selfish behavior in games where players are embedded in a social context. A framework is presented which allows us to measure the Windfall of Friendship, i.e., how much players benefit (compared to purely selfish…

Getting agents in the Internet, and in networks in general, to invest in and deploy security features and protocols is a challenge, in particular because of economic reasons arising from the presence of network externalities. Our goal in…

We propose interdependent defense (IDD) games, a computational game-theoretic framework to study aspects of the interdependence of risk and security in multi-agent systems under deliberate external attacks. Our model builds upon…

Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…