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相关论文: Crowdsourcing with Tullock contests: A new perspec…

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Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing…

多智能体系统 · 计算机科学 2018-12-13 Tie Luo , Salil S. Kanhere , Sajal K. Das , Hwee-Pink Tan

We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2011-11-15 Shuchi Chawla , Jason D. Hartline , Balasubramanian Sivan

We investigate the design of mechanisms to incentivize high quality in crowdsourcing environments with strategic agents, when entry is an endogenous, strategic choice. Modeling endogenous entry in crowdsourcing is important because there is…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2015-03-20 Arpita Ghosh , Preston McAfee

This paper investigates the incentive mechanism design from a novel and practically important perspective in which mobile users as contributors do not join simultaneously and a requester desires large efforts from early contributors. A…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2017-10-06 Yuedong Xu , Yifan Zhou , Yifan Mao , Xu Chen , Xiang Li

In competitive resource allocation, a central coordinator may seek to gain an advantage not by directly controlling subordinate agents, but by strategically manipulating the information they receive. We study this problem within the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-05-11 Gilberto Diaz-Garcia , Keith Paarporn , Jason R. Marden

Crowdsourcing websites (e.g. Yahoo! Answers, Amazon Mechanical Turk, and etc.) emerged in recent years that allow requesters from all around the world to post tasks and seek help from an equally global pool of workers. However, intrinsic…

人工智能 · 计算机科学 2011-08-11 Yu Zhang , Mihaela van der Schaar

Significant effort has been made to understand user motivation and to elicit user participation in crowdsourcing systems. However, incentive engineering, i.e., designing incentives that can purposefully motivate users, is still an open…

人机交互 · 计算机科学 2016-09-07 Nhat V. Q. Truong , Sebastian Stein , Long Tran-Thanh , Nicholas R. Jennings

In a crowdsourcing contest, a principal holding a task posts it to a crowd. People in the crowd then compete with each other to win the rewards. Although in real life, a crowd is usually networked and people influence each other via social…

人工智能 · 计算机科学 2022-11-23 Qi Shi , Dong Hao

Crowdsourcing has emerged as a paradigm for leveraging human intelligence and activity to solve a wide range of tasks. However, strategic workers will find enticement in their self-interest to free-ride and attack in a crowdsourcing contest…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2018-01-01 Jianfeng Lu , Yun Xin , Zhao Zhang , Shaojie Tang , Songyuan Yan , Changbing Tang

Machine Learning competitions such as the Netflix Prize have proven reasonably successful as a method of "crowdsourcing" prediction tasks. But these competitions have a number of weaknesses, particularly in the incentive structure they…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2011-11-14 Jacob Abernethy , Rafael M. Frongillo

In this paper, we aim to gain a better understanding into how paid microtask crowdsourcing could leverage its appeal and scaling power by using contests to boost crowd performance and engagement. We introduce our microtask-based annotation…

计算机与社会 · 计算机科学 2019-01-18 Oluwaseyi Feyisetan , Elena Simperl

In this paper, we consider the problem of incentive mechanism design for smart-phone crowd-sourcing. Each user participating in crowd-sourcing submits a set of tasks it can accomplish and its corresponding bid. The platform then selects the…

计算机与社会 · 计算机科学 2013-10-09 Ashwin Subramanian , G Sai Kanth , Rahul Vaze

While microtask crowdsourcing provides a new way to solve large volumes of small tasks at a much lower price compared with traditional in-house solutions, it suffers from quality problems due to the lack of incentives. On the other hand,…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2013-05-30 Yang Gao , Yan Chen , K. J. Ray Liu

In crowdsourcing markets, there are two different type jobs, i.e. homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs, which need to be allocated to workers. Incentive mechanisms are essential to attract extensive user participating for achieving good…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2014-07-23 Jiajun Sun

Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages the pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect and upload sensing data, enabling numerous novel applications. To achieve good service quality for a crowd sensing application, incentive…

网络与互联网体系结构 · 计算机科学 2014-12-25 Jiajun Sun

Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2018-11-01 Jiangtian Nie , Jun Luo , Zehui Xiong , Dusit Niyato , Ping Wang

Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages the ubiquity of sensor-equipped mobile devices to collect data. To achieve good quality for crowd sensing, incentive mechanisms are indispensable to attract more participants. Most of existing…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2014-05-01 Jiajun Sun

Mobile Crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive Mobile Users (MUs). The MUs will participate in a Crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2018-08-14 Jiangtian Nie , Zehui Xiong , Dusit Niyato , Ping Wang , Jun Luo

As the amount of data collected for crowdsensing applications increases rapidly due to improved sensing capabilities and the increasing number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the cloud server is no longer able to handle the large-scale…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2020-12-10 Jer Shyuan Ng , Wei Yang Bryan Lim , Sahil Garg , Zehui Xiong , Dusit Niyato , Mohsen Guizani , Cyril Leung

Tullock contests model real-life scenarios that range from competition among proof-of-work blockchain miners to rent-seeking and lobbying activities. We show that continuous-time best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex costs…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-11-01 Edith Elkind , Abheek Ghosh , Paul W. Goldberg
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