相关论文: Manipulability of consular election rules

In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…

This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents' payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions…

We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…

Arrow's celebrated Impossibility Theorem asserts that an election rule, or Social Welfare Function (SWF), between three or more candidates meeting a set of strict criteria cannot exist. Maskin suggests that Arrow's conditions for SWFs are…

The election, a cornerstone of democracy, is one of the best-recognizable symbols of democratic governance. Voters' confidence in elections is essential, and these days, we can watch practically in live broadcast what consequences distrust…

The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of a randomized mechanism, a social decision scheme (SDS), with desirable fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness properties unmatched by all known SDSs. In particular, we disprove a…

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a seminal result of Social Choice Theory that demonstrates the impossibility of ranked-choice decision-making processes to jointly satisfy a number of intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints. The…

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem establishes bounds on what we can require from voting systems. Given satisfaction of a small collection of "fairness" axioms, it shows votes can only exist as dictatorships in which one voter determines all…

Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have received much attention recently, and the former has quickly become a quite widely used election system. For many cases these systems have been proven resistant to bribery, control, or manipulation,…

Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as…

We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a Dictator has to be non-transitive. In this paper we study quantitative versions of Arrow…

In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…

In the realm of algorithmic economics, voting systems are evaluated and compared by examining the properties or axioms they satisfy. While this pursuit has yielded valuable insights, it has also led to seminal impossibility results such as…

Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule…

May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that…

Manipulation models for electoral systems are a core research theme in social choice theory; they include bribery (unweighted, weighted, swap, shift, ...), control (by adding or deleting voters or candidates), lobbying in referenda and…

We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index to social choice rules. Three players who have multiple votes in a committee decide between three options by…

The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric…

We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…