相关论文: Swap Equilibria under Link and Vertex Destruction

We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…

We explore the robustness of complex networks against physical damage. We focus on spatially embedded network models and datasets where links are physical objects or physically transfer some quantity, which can be disrupted at any point…

The advancement of generalized deepfake disruption is constrained by the interruption imbalance, a fundamental bottleneck inherent to the generation of universal perturbations. We reveal that conventional static gradient normalization…

Spectre and Meltdown attacks and their variants exploit hardware performance optimization features to cause security breaches. Secret information is accessed and leaked through covert or side channels. New attack variants keep appearing and…

We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha>0$ in order to get connected to the…

Consider a cooperation game on a spatial network of habitat patches, where players can relocate between patches if they judge the local conditions to be unfavorable. In time, the relocation events may lead to a homogeneous state where all…

Model ensemble adversarial attack has become a powerful method for generating transferable adversarial examples that can target even unknown models, but its theoretical foundation remains underexplored. To address this gap, we provide early…

We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…

An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk of being infected and…

Inspired by scenarios where the strategic network design and defense or immunisation are of the central importance, Goyal et al. [3] defined a new Network Formation Game with Attack and Immunisation. The authors showed that despite the…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games of m (m >= 2) identical servers, in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost, given by the workload of the server it chooses.…

This paper studies game-type credit default swaps that allow the protection buyer and seller to raise or reduce their respective positions once prior to default. This leads to the study of an optimal stopping game subject to early default…

Westudy how a planner can design dynamic interventions to overcome status-quo inertia in living temporal games, where strategic agents control their state (active, sleep, partially dead) on a temporal network. Building on the…

Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models…

Spot electricity markets are considered under a Game-Theoretic framework, where risk averse players submit orders to the market clearing mechanism to maximise their own utility. Consistent with the current practice in Europe, the market…

How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…

Assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, we show strong inapproximability results for two natural vertex deletion problems on directed graphs: for any integer $k\geq 2$ and arbitrary small $\epsilon > 0$, the Feedback Vertex Set problem and…

We consider the problem of self-healing in peer-to-peer networks that are under repeated attack by an omniscient adversary. We assume that, over a sequence of rounds, an adversary either inserts a node with arbitrary connections or deletes…

In society, mutual cooperation, defection, and asymmetric exploitative relationships are common. Whereas cooperation and defection are studied extensively in the literature on game theory, asymmetric exploitative relationships between…