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相关论文: Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maxim…

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This paper is merged with arXiv:2107.08965v2. We refer the reader to the full and updated version. We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with 2-value additive valuations. Our goal is to find an…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-10-13 Hannaneh Akrami , Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury , Kurt Mehlhorn , Golnoosh Shahkarami , Quentin Vermande

We consider a scenario where a retailer can set different prices for different consumers in a smart grid. The retailer's objective is to maximize the revenue, minimize the operating cost, and maximize the consumer's welfare. The retailer…

最优化与控制 · 数学 2021-11-09 Diptangshu Sen , Kushaagra Goyal , Varun Ramamohan , Arnob Ghosh

Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2009-04-17 Patrick Briest , Shuchi Chawla , Robert Kleinberg , S. Matthew Weinberg

In recent years, many new and interesting models of successful online business have been developed. Many of these are based on the competition between users, such as online auctions, where the product price is not fixed and tends to rise.…

经济学 · 定量金融 2016-03-01 Pierluigi Gallo , Francesco Randazzo , Ignazio Gallo

We address a dynamic pricing problem for airlines aiming to maximize expected revenue from selling cargo space on a single-leg flight. The cargo shipments' weight and volume are uncertain and their precise values remain unavailable at the…

最优化与控制 · 数学 2024-04-09 Chengyu Du , Fang He , Xi Lin

It was recently shown in [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Bayesian auction problems with arbitrary (possibly…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2013-05-20 Yang Cai , Constantinos Daskalakis , S. Matthew Weinberg

We study an online revenue maximization problem where the consumers arrive i.i.d from some unknown distribution and purchase a bundle of products from the sellers. The classical approach generally assumes complete knowledge of the consumer…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-10-04 Owen Shen

In this paper, the problem of optimal dynamic pricing for retail electricity with an unknown demand model is considered. Under the day-ahead dynamic pricing (a.k.a. real time pricing) mechanism, a retailer obtains electricity in a…

最优化与控制 · 数学 2014-04-07 Liyan Jia , Lang Tong , Qing Zhao

This study introduces an optimal mechanism in a dynamic stochastic knapsack environment. The model features a single seller who has a fixed quantity of a perfectly divisible item. Impatient buyers with a piece-wise linear utility function…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-02-23 Jihyeok Jung , Chan-Oi Song , Deok-Joo Lee , Kiho Yoon

Social goods are goods that grant value not only to their owners but also to the owners' surroundings, be it their families, friends or office mates. The benefit a non-owner derives from the good is affected by many factors, including the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2017-07-04 Alon Eden , Tomer Ezra , Michal Feldman

We consider a dynamic pricing problem under unknown demand models. In this problem a seller offers prices to a stream of customers and observes either success or failure in each sale attempt. The underlying demand model is unknown to the…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2012-10-30 Pouya Tehrani , Yixuan Zhai , Qing Zhao

We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2017-02-23 Amy Greenwald , Takehiro Oyakawa , Vasilis Syrgkanis

We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the buyer's value, but the buyer discovers her true value only…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-07-08 Saeed Alaei , Shuchi Chawla , Zhiyi Huang , Ali Makhdoumi , Azarakhsh Malekian

Incentive-based coordination mechanisms for distributed energy consumption have shown promise in aligning individual user objectives with social welfare, especially under privacy constraints. Our prior work proposed a two-timescale adaptive…

系统与控制 · 电气工程与系统科学 2025-04-02 Jiayi Li , Jiale Wei , Matthew Motoki , Yan Jiang , Baosen Zhang

This paper studies the efficiency of battery storage operations in electricity markets by comparing the social welfare gain achieved by a central planner to that of a decentralized profit-maximizing operator. The problem is formulated in a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-02-24 Zhile Jiang , Xinhao Nie , Stratis Skoulakis

We propose a new efficient online algorithm to learn the parameters governing the purchasing behavior of a utility maximizing buyer, who responds to prices, in a repeated interaction setting. The key feature of our algorithm is that it can…

机器学习 · 统计学 2018-03-07 Debjyoti Saharoy , Theja Tulabandhula

We present pricing mechanisms for several online resource allocation problems which obtain tight or nearly tight approximations to social welfare. In our settings, buyers arrive online and purchase bundles of items; buyers' values for the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2018-07-16 Shuchi Chawla , J. Benjamin Miller , Yifeng Teng

We study an online dynamic pricing problem where the potential demand at each time period $t=1,2,\ldots, T$ is stochastic and dependent on the price. However, a perishable inventory is imposed at the beginning of each time $t$, censoring…

机器学习 · 统计学 2026-01-26 Jianyu Xu , Yining Wang , Xi Chen , Yu-Xiang Wang

We consider a repeated auction where the buyer's utility for an item depends on the time that elapsed since his last purchase. We present an algorithm to build the optimal bidding policy, and then, because optimal might be impractical, we…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2023-08-04 Benjamin Heymann , Alexandre Gilotte , Rémi Chan-Renous

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-05-25 Daniel Halpern , Nisarg Shah