相关论文: Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders…

We study equilibrium in hedonic markets, when consumers and suppliers have reservation utilities, and the utility functions are separable with respect to price. There is one indivisible good, which comes in different qualities; each…

Projected gradient ascent is known to satisfy no-external regret as a learning algorithm. However, recent empirical work shows that projected gradient ascent often finds the Nash equilibrium in settings beyond two-player zero-sum…

We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…

It is a common belief that computing a market equilibrium in Fisher's spending model is easier than computing a market equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu's exchange model. This belief is built on the fact that we have more algorithmic success in…

This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of…

Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings, distributions exist for which the seller's optimal…

The recent online platforms propose multiple items for bidding. The state of the art, however, is limited to the analysis of one item auction without resubmission. In this paper we study multi-item lowest unique bid auctions (LUBA) with…

In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an…

In an incomplete semimartingale model of a financial market, we consider several risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of a bundle of contingent claims. Assuming that the agents' risk preferences are modelled by convex…

We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such…

We revisit the classical topic of quadratic and linear mean-variance equilibria with both financial and real assets. The novelty of our results is that they are the first allowing for equilibrium prices driven by general semimartingales and…

We present the first analysis of Fisher markets with buyers that have budget-additive utility functions. Budget-additive utilities are elementary concave functions with numerous applications in online adword markets and revenue optimization…

We develop a hierarchical Bayesian dynamic game for competitive inventory and pricing under incomplete information. Two firms repeatedly choose order quantities and prices while facing two layers of uncertainty: unknown market demand and…

The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…

Budget constraints are ubiquitous in online advertisement auctions. To manage these constraints and smooth out the expenditure across auctions, the bidders (or the platform on behalf of them) often employ pacing: each bidder is assigned a…

We prove that the problem of computing an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-complete even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave utility functions. In fact, our proof shows that this market-equilibrium…

A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this…

We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…

We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to smooth…