相关论文: Blotto Games with Costly Winnings

In this work we successfully present a quantum version of the multiplayer Colonel Blotto game. We find that players with access to the quantum strategies has a advantage over the classical ones. The payoff is invariant under the order of…

The Colonel Blotto Problem proposed by Borel in 1921 has served as a widely applicable model of budget-constrained simultaneous winner-take-all competitions in the social sciences. Applications include elections, advertising, R&D and more.…

The Colonel Blotto game, introduced by Borel in the 1920s, is often used for modeling various real-life settings, such as elections, lobbying, etc. The game is based on the allocation of limited resources by players to a set of fields. Each…

The General Lotto game is a popular variant of the famous Colonel Blotto game, in which two opposing players allocate limited resources over many battlefields. In this paper, we consider incomplete and asymmetric information formulations…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

The Colonel Blotto game, first introduced by Borel in 1921, is a well-studied game theory classic. Two colonels each have a pool of troops that they divide simultaneously among a set of battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is the…

We consider the following Colonel Blotto game between parties $P_1$ and $P_A.$ $P_1$ deploys a non negative number of troops across $J$ battlefields, while $P_A$ chooses $K,$ $K < J,$ battlefields to remove all of $P_1$'s troops from the…

This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…

Resource allocation problems across multiple contests are ubiquitous in adversarial settings, from military operations to market competition. While Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games have provided valuable theoretical foundations for…

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…

When multiple agents are engaged in a network of conflict, some can advance their competitive positions by forming alliances with each other. However, the costs associated with establishing an alliance may outweigh the potential benefits.…

This work addresses competitive resource allocation in a sequential setting, where two players allocate resources across objects or locations of shared interest. Departing from the simultaneous Colonel Blotto game, our framework introduces…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

When a centrally operated ride-hailing company considers to enter a market already served by another company, it has to make a strategic decision about how to distribute its fleet among different regions in the area. This decision will be…

In a multi-battle contest, each time a player competes by investing some of her budgets or resources in a component battle to collect a value if winning the battle. There are multiple battles to fight, and the budgets get consumed over…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval…

In the Colonel Blotto game, which was initially introduced by Borel in 1921, two colonels simultaneously distribute their troops across different battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is determined independently by a winner-take-all…

We study $n$-dimensional contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs, where each dimension (battle) is modeled as a Tullock contest. Prize-allocation rules are identity-independent, budget-balanced, and weakly increasing in…

In competitive resource allocation environments, agents often choose to form alliances; however, for some agents, doing so may not always be beneficial. Is there a method of forming alliances that always reward each of their members? We…

Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…