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The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of cores of games, right from the early days of this notion to the present time. The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} introduced the "right" way of…
We propose a novel decision making framework for forming potential collaboration among otherwise competing agents in subsurface systems. The agents can be, e.g., groundwater, CO$_2$, or hydrogen injectors and extractors with conflicting…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…
The class of exact transferable utility coalitional games, introduced in 1972 by Schmeidler, has been studied both in the context of game theory and in the context of imprecise probabilities. We characterize the cone of exact games by…
Recent successes of game-theoretic formulations in ML have caused a resurgence of research interest in differentiable games. Overwhelmingly, that research focuses on methods and upper bounds on their speed of convergence. In this work, we…