相关论文: The Principal-Agent Problem With Time Inconsistent…

In this paper, finite-time state consensus problems for continuous-time multi-agent systems are discussed, and two distributive protocols, which ensure that the states of agents reach an agreement in a finite time, are presented. By…

We introduce a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit…

In this paper, we formulate a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear--quadratic (LQ) control problem. The time-inconsistency arises from the presence of a quadratic term of the expected state as well as a state-dependent term in the…

In this paper, we address three Principal--Agent problems in a moral hazard context and show that they are connected. We start by studying the problem of Principal with multiple Agents in cooperation. The term cooperation is manifested here…

For optimal stopping problems with time-inconsistent preference, we measure the inherent level of time-inconsistency by taking the time needed to turn the naive strategies into the sophisticated ones. In particular, when in a repeated…

In this short communication, we first recall a version of the Pontryagin maximum principle for general finite-dimensional nonlinear optimal sampled-data control problems. This result was recently obtained in [L. Bourdin and E. Tr{\'e}lat ,…

Time-inconsistency is a characteristic of human behavior in which people plan for long-term benefits but take actions that differ from the plan due to conflicts with short-term benefits. Such time-inconsistent behavior is believed to be…

While sequential task assignment for a single agent has been widely studied, such problems in a multi-agent setting, where the agents have heterogeneous task preferences or capabilities, remain less well-characterized. We study a…

We derive fundamental performance limitations for intrinsic average consensus problems in open multi-agent systems, which are systems subject to frequent arrivals and departures of agents. Each agent holds a value, and the objective of the…

We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over agent's…

In this paper, which is a continuation of the previously published discrete time paper we develop a theory for continuous time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a…

In this paper we consider a principal agent problem where the agent is allowed to quit, by incurring a cost. When the current agent quits the job, the principal will hire a new one, possibly with a different type. We characterize the…

In this paper we investigate a Principal-Agent problem with moral hazard under Knightian uncertainty. We extend the seminal framework of Holmstr\"om and Milgrom by combining a Stackelberg equilibrium with a worst-case approach. We…

Distributed optimization problems have received much attention due to their privacy preservation, parallel computation, less communication, and strong robustness. This paper presents and studies the time-varying distributed optimization…

The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided a rich body of structural and algorithmic insights into this…

Dynamic contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. In this paper, we extend the single-agent dynamic incentive contract model in continuous-time to a multi-agent scheme…

Adding a capacity constraint to a hidden-action principal-agent problem results in the same set of Pareto optimal contracts as the unconstrained problem where output is scaled down by a constant factor. This scaling factor is increasing in…

This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatures. The problems we consider involve a principal or seller…

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. In…

We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems in presence of adverse selection. The particular features…