相关论文: On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance A…

In school choice problems, the motivation for students' welfare (efficiency) is restrained by concerns to respect schools' priorities (fairness). Among the fair matchings, even the best one in terms of welfare (SOSM) is inefficient.…

In many machine learning applications, there are multiple decision-makers involved, both automated and human. The interaction between these agents often goes unaddressed in algorithmic development. In this work, we explore a simple version…

The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…

We consider a setting in which $N$ agents aim to speedup a common Stochastic Approximation (SA) problem by acting in parallel and communicating with a central server. We assume that the up-link transmissions to the server are subject to…

We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…

Currently, there is a surge of interest in fair Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) research which aims to mitigate discriminatory bias in AI algorithms, e.g. along lines of gender, age, and race. While most research in…

We study distributed user association in 5G and beyond millimeter-wave enabled heterogeneous networks using matching theory. We propose a novel and efficient distributed matching game, called early acceptance (EA), which allows users to…

In this paper, we study university admissions under a centralized system that uses grades and standardized test scores to match applicants to university programs. We consider affirmative action policies that seek to increase the number of…

We study the tiered deferred acceptance mechanism used in school admissions, such as in China and Turkey. This mechanism partitions schools into tiers and applies the deferred acceptance algorithm within each tier. Once assigned, students…

The matching literature often recommends market centralization under the assumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferences are fixed. We find counterevidence to this assumption in a quasi-experiment. In Germany's…

We study the distribution of envy in random matching markets under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using tools from applied probability, we compute the expected number of proposing agents whom nobody envies and those who envy…

The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is a popular school allocation mechanism thanks to its strategy proofness. However, with application costs, strategy proofness fails, leading to an identification problem. In this paper, I address this…

The field of mobile agent (MA) technology has been intensively researched during the past few years, resulting in the phenomenal proliferation of available MA platforms, all sharing several common design characteristics. Research projects…

We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC). Our metrics are designed to capture the…

Undesired bias afflicts both human and algorithmic decision making, and may be especially prevalent when information processing trade-offs incentivize the use of heuristics. One primary example is \textit{statistical discrimination} --…

In this work, we consider a school choice scenario where a student does not exactly know which college is better for her. Although it is hard for a student to obtain an exact preference, she can usually compare specific features of…

In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…

In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…

An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…

We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we investigate a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem where…