相关论文: An Ordinal Minimax Theorem

The Shapley value, originating from cooperative game theory, has been employed to define responsibility measures that quantify the contributions of database facts to obtaining a given query answer. For non-numeric queries, this is done by…

Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…

We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are $n$ players, $n\geq 3$. Each player is denoted by $i$. Two strategic variables are $t_i$ and $s_i$, $i\in \{1, \dots, n\}$. They are related by…

A game theory inspired methodology is proposed for finding a function's saddle points. While explicit descent methods are known to have severe convergence issues, implicit methods are natural in an adversarial setting, as they take the…

In this work, after given the definition of soft sets and their basic operations we define two person soft games which can apply to problems contain vagueness and uncertainty. We then give four solution methods of the games which are soft…

While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the constraints that optimal solutions need to satisfy, and…

The \emph{stationary set splitting game} is a game of perfect information of length $\omega_{1}$ between two players, \unspls and \spl, in which \unspls chooses stationarily many countable ordinals and \spls tries to continuously divide…

Every weighted tree corresponds naturally to a cooperative game that we call a "tree game"; it assigns to each subset of leaves the sum of the weights of the minimal subtree spanned by those leaves. In the context of phylogenetic trees, the…

In this paper, we deal with the solutions of systems of PDEs with bilateral inter-connected obstacles of min-max and max-min types. These systems arise naturally in stochastic switching zero-sum game problems. We show that when the…

Playing impartial games under the normal and misere conventions may differ a lot. However, there are also many "exceptions" for which the normal and misere plays are very similar. As early as in 1901 Bouton noticed that this is the case…

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…

We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…

Finite objects and more specifically finite games are formalized using induction, whereas infinite objects are formalized using coinduction. In this article, after an introduction to the concept of coinduction, we revisit on infinite…

An elegant characterization of the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems has emerged in the form of the the algebraic dichotomy conjecture of [BKJ00]. Roughly speaking, the characterization asserts that a CSP {\Lambda} is tractable…

We consider a two-player zero-sum game with integral payoff and with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff is chosen among a continuous set of possible payoffs. We prove that the value function of this game is solution of an…

Combinatorial Game Theory has also been called `additive game theory', whenever the analysis involves sums of independent game components. Such {\em disjunctive sums} invoke comparison between games, which allows abstract values to be…

We study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games known as \textit{blind stochastic games}, where players neither observe the state nor receive any information about it during the game. A central concept for analyzing long-duration…

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible resources to players so as to maximize the minimum total value any player receives. This problem is sometimes dubbed the Santa Claus problem and its different variants have been subject to…

The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…