相关论文: Strategyproof Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Hybri…

Recent years have witnessed the rise of many successful e-commerce marketplace platforms like the Amazon marketplace, AirBnB, Uber/Lyft, and Upwork, where a central platform mediates economic transactions between buyers and sellers.…

This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the…

In traditional facility location problems, a set of points is provided, and the objective is to determine the best location for a new facility based on criteria such as minimizing cost, time, and distances between clients and facilities.…

We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this setting, 2n agents must be paired up and assigned to n…

We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…

The problem considered in this paper is the weighted obnoxious facility location in the convex hull of demand points. The objective function is to maximize the smallest weighted distance between a facility and a set of demand points. Three…

We present a randomized distributed approximation algorithm for the metric uncapacitated facility location problem. The algorithm is executed on a bipartite graph in the Congest model yielding a (1.861 + epsilon) approximation factor, where…

This article describes a model and an exact solution method for facility location problems with decision-dependent uncertainties. The model allows characterizing the probability distribution of the random elements as a function of the…

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and…

In this paper, we introduce and study the Facility Location Problem with Aleatory Agents (FLPAA), where the facility accommodates n agents larger than the number of agents reporting their preferences, namely n_r. The spare capacity is used…

Location Routing is a fundamental planning problem in logistics, in which strategic location decisions on the placement of facilities (depots, distribution centers, warehouses etc.) are taken based on accurate estimates of operational…

In Facility Location problems there are agents that should be connected to facilities and locations where facilities may be opened so that agents can connect to them. We depart from Uncapacitated Facility Location and by assuming that the…

We study a version of the metric facility location problem (or, equivalently, variants of the committee selection problem) in which we must choose $k$ facilities in an arbitrary metric space to serve some set of clients $C$. We consider…

Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015]. However, it…

We consider a scenario consisting of a set of heterogeneous mobile agents located at a depot, and a set of tasks dispersed over a geographic area. The agents are partitioned into different types. The tasks are partitioned into specialized…

This paper deals with a bilevel approach of the location-allocation problem with dimensional facilities. We present a general model that allows us to consider very general shapes of domains for the dimensional facilities and we prove the…

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…

Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…

In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, \citet{NR99} studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrelated machines aiming to minimize the makespan. They provided…

We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is…