相关论文: On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-pl…

It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…

We show that there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games with any fixed number of strategies (a very broad and important class of games), extending the two-strategy result of Daskalakis…

We study stationary mean field games with singular controls in which the representative player interacts with a long-time weighted average of the population through a discounted and an ergodic performance criterion. This class of games…

In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…

This paper studies an optimal investment-consumption problem for competitive agents with exponential or power utilities and a common finite time horizon. Each agent regards the average of habit formation and wealth from all peers as…

In this paper, we address an instance of uniquely solvable mean-field game with a common noise whose corresponding counterpart without common noise has several equilibria. We study the selection problem for this mean-field game without…

In this paper, we consider a first-order mean field game model motivated by crowd motion in which agents evolve in a (not necessarily compact) metric space and wish to reach a given target set. Each agent aims to minimize the sum of their…

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionarymultiple access control game with continuousvariable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria of the game and show that the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient…

We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…

Sequential equilibrium is the conventional approach for analyzing multi-stage games of incomplete information. It relies on mutual consistency of beliefs. To relax mutual consistency, I theoretically and experimentally explore the dynamic…

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…

We study a general formulation of the classical two-player Dynkin game in a discrete time Markovian setting. We identify an appropriate class of mixed strategies -- \textit{Markovian randomized stopping times} -- in which players stop at…

We tackle a fundamental problem in empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), that of learning equilibria of simulation-based games. Such games cannot be described in analytical form; instead, a black-box simulator can be queried to obtain…

We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate…

The concept of evolutionarily stability and its relation with the fixed points of the replicator equation are important aspects of evolutionary game dynamics. In the light of the fact that oscillating state of a population and individuals…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…