相关论文: Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Dis…

We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is…

We consider the pricing problem facing a seller of a contingent claim. We assume that this seller has some general level of partial information, and that he is not allowed to sell short in certain assets. This pricing problem, which is our…

Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective approach for revenue maximizing mechanism design. The AMA mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually rational (if the agents' valuations for the outcomes are…

In this paper we consider a distributed optimization scenario in which a set of agents has to solve a convex optimization problem with separable cost function, local constraint sets and a coupling inequality constraint. We propose a novel…

Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…

A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of…

We study the combinatorial assignment domain, which includes combinatorial auctions and course allocation. The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several…

It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical,…

Fair resource allocation is a fundamental optimization problem with applications in operations research, networking, and economic and game theory. Research in these areas has led to the general acceptance of a class of $\alpha$-fair utility…

In this paper, we study expected utility maximization under ratchet and drawdown constraints on consumption in a general incomplete semimartingale market using duality methods. The optimization is considered with respect to two parameters:…

Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are…

We develop a new randomized iterative algorithm---stochastic dual ascent (SDA)---for finding the projection of a given vector onto the solution space of a linear system. The method is dual in nature: with the dual being a non-strongly…

We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK…

In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for reducing the $k$-item $n$-bidder auction with additive valuation to $k$-item $1$-bidder auctions. This approach, called the \emph{Best-Guess} reduction, can be applied to address several…

A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…

We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game…

We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and subadditive. We…

We consider a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, where the sellers run locally independent Progressive Second-Price (PSP) auctions, and buyers may participate in multiple auctions, forming a multi-auction market with perfect…