相关论文: On Defendability of Security Properties

In this paper we focus on noncooperative games with uncertain constraints coupling the agents' decisions. We consider a setting where bounded deviations of agents' decisions from the equilibrium are possible, and uncertain constraints are…

In the contemporary digital landscape, cybersecurity has become a critical issue due to the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. This study utilizes a non-zero-sum game theoretical framework to model the strategic…

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…

In the field of international security, understanding the strategic interactions between countries within a networked context is crucial. Our previous research has introduced a ``games-on-signed graphs'' framework~\cite{LiMorse2022} to…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

Correctness is an emergent property of systems where exposing error is cheaper than committing it. In dynamic, low-trust environments, autonomous AI agents benefit from delegating work to sub-agents, yet correctness cannot be assured…

Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing…

In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have recently emerged as a significant security challenge for a cyber-physical system due to their stealthy, dynamic and adaptive nature. Proactive dynamic defenses provide a strategic and holistic…

We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

We explore a scenario involving two sites and a sequential game between a defender and an attacker, where the defender is responsible for securing the sites while the attacker aims to attack them. Each site holds a loss value for the…

We consider the problem of finding optimal classifiers in an adversarial setting where the class-1 data is generated by an attacker whose objective is not known to the defender -- an aspect that is key to realistic applications but has so…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…

We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…

We describe a mechanism to create fair and explainable incentives for software developers to reward contributions to security of a product. We use cooperative game theory to model the actions of the developer team inside a risk management…

The results of a learning process depend on the input data. There are cases in which an adversary can strategically tamper with the input data to affect the outcome of the learning process. While some datasets are difficult to attack, many…

The most popular stability notion in games should be Nash equilibrium under the rationality of players who maximize their own payoff individually. In contrast, in many scenarios, players can be (partly) irrational with some unpredictable…

Transparency and security are both central to Responsible AI, but they may conflict in adversarial settings. We investigate the strategic effect of transparency for agents through the lens of transferable adversarial example attacks. In…