相关论文: DValue for Boolean games is EXP-complete
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
A vertex $u$ in a graph $G$ totally dominates a vertex $v$ if $u$ is adjacent to $v$ in $G$. A total dominating set of $G$ is a set $S$ of vertices of $G$ such that every vertex of $G$ is totally dominated by a vertex in $S$. The indicated…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum differential game in the case where a payoff is determined by the exit time, that is, the first time when the system leaves the game domain. Additionally, we assume that a part of domain's boundary is…
For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value…
This paper gives a complete analysis of worst-case equilibria for various versions of weighted congestion games with two players and affine cost functions. The results are exact price of anarchy bounds which are parametric in the weights of…
We provide a formal definition of depth-limited games together with an accessible and rigorous explanation of the underlying concepts, both of which were previously missing in imperfect-information games. The definition works for an…
The Value Problem for weighted timed games (wtgs) consists in determining, given a two-player weighted timed game with a reachability objective and a rational threshold, whether or not the value of the game exceeds the threshold. When…
This paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. Let games for some family have common dynamics, running costs and capabilities of players, and let these games differ in densities only. We show that the Dynamic Programming…
We prove for every $n\ge4$ the existence of an $n$-player game in normal form with integer payoffs that has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is fully mixed. In the equilibrium, each probability weight is an algebraic number of degree…
We investigate a game played between two players, Maker and Breaker, on a countably infinite complete graph where the vertices are the rational numbers. The players alternately claim unclaimed edges. It is Maker's goal to have after…
Given the family $P$ of all nonempty subsets of a set $U$ of alternatives, a choice over $U$ is a function $c \colon \Omega \to P$ such that $\Omega \subseteq P$ and $c(B) \subseteq B$ for all menus $B \in \Omega$. A choice is total if…
In \emph{zero-sum two-player hidden stochastic games}, players observe partial information about the state. We address: $(i)$ the existence of the \emph{uniform value}, i.e., a limiting average payoff that both players can guarantee for…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual solutions of some…
The Value Problem for weighted timed games (WTGs) consists in determining, given a two-player weighted timed game with a reachability objective and a rational threshold, whether or not the value of the game exceeds the threshold. This…
We study two-player zero-sum games over infinite-state graphs with boundedness conditions. Our first contribution is about the strategy complexity, i.e the memory required for winning strategies: we prove that over general infinite-state…
The semigroup game is a two-person zero-sum game defined on a semigroup S as follows: Players 1 and 2 choose elements x and y in S, respectively, and player 1 receives a payoff f(xy) defined by a function f from S to [-1,1]. If the…
We consider a two-player zero-sum deterministic differential game where each player uses both continuous and impulse controls in infinite-time horizon. We assume that the impulses supposed to be of general term and the costs depend on the…
The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity, and the limit of value functions of…
In a two-player zero-sum graph game the players move a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Traditionally, the players alternate turns in moving the token. In {\em bidding…
Admissibility has been studied for games of infinite duration with Boolean objectives. We extend here this study to games of infinite duration with quantitative objectives. First, we show that, un- der the assumption that optimal worst-case…