相关论文: Optimal Spectrum Auction Design with Two-Dimension…

Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving…

Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…

We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…

In a cognitive radio (CR) network, CR users intend to operate over the same spectrum band licensed to legacy networks. A tradeoff exists between protecting the communications in legacy networks and maximizing the throughput of CR…

In digital advertising, online platforms allocate ad impressions through real-time auctions, where advertisers typically rely on autobidding agents to optimize bids on their behalf. Unlike traditional auctions for physical goods, the value…

This paper studies a wireless network where multiple users cooperate with each other to improve the overall network performance. Our goal is to design an optimal distributed power allocation algorithm that enables user cooperation, in…

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…

The growing demand in mobile Internet access calls for high capacity and energy efficient cellular access with better cell coverage. The in-band relaying solution, proposed in LTE-Advanced, improves coverage without requiring additional…

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…

In this paper, a new cooperation structure for spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks is proposed which outperforms the existing commonly-used ones in terms of energy efficiency. The efficiency is achieved in the proposed design by…

Spectrum auction is an effective approach to improving spectrum utilization, by leasing idle spectrum from primary users to secondary users. Recently, a few differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed, but, as far…

We consider a general multi-connectivity framework, intended for ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC) services, and propose a novel, preallocation-based combinatorial auction approach for the efficient allocation of channels.…

In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…

The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize…

An important aspect of the Future Internet is the efficient utilization of (wireless) network resources. In order for the - demanding in terms of QoS - Future Internet services to be provided, the current trend is evolving towards an…

It is unrealistic to assume that all nodes in an ad hoc wireless network would be willing to participate in cooperative communication, especially if their desired Quality-of- Service (QoS) is achievable via direct transmission. An…

We study truthful auctions for secondary spectrum usage in wireless networks. In this scenario, n communication requests need to be allocated to k available channels that are subject to interference and noise. We present the first truthful…

Finding optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions is a hard problem and finding approximations to the optimal solution is also hard. We investigate the use of Branch-and-Bound techniques: they require both a way to bound from…

In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the…

Auctions are important mechanisms extensively implemented in various markets, e.g., search engines' keyword auctions, antique auctions, etc. Finding an optimal auction mechanism is extremely difficult due to the constraints of imperfect…