相关论文: A Simple Character String Proof of the "True but U…
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…
The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem says that for every sufficiently rich formal theory (containing formal arithmetic in some natural sense) there exist true unprovable statements. Such statements would be natural candidates for being…
G\"odel's first and second incompleteness theorems are corner stones of modern mathematics. In this article we present a new proof of these theorems for ZFC and theories containing ZFC, using Chaitin's incompleteness theorem and a very…
We prove, for stably computably enumerable formal systems, direct analogues of the first and second incompleteness theorems of G\"odel. A typical stably computably enumerable set is the set of Diophantine equations with no integer…
G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…
This proof of Godel's first incompleteness theorem doesn't require omega-consistency, nor does it refer to codes of negated sentences as in Rosser's. It begins from where Godel's usual proof ends, and stalks it till it ends proving it.
A detailed and rigorous analysis of G\"odel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what G\"odel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon…
We give a reframing of Godel's first and second incompleteness theorems that applies even to some undefinable theories of arithmetic. The usual Hilbert-Bernays provability conditions and the diagonal lemma are replaced by a more direct…
The prevalent interpretation of G\"odel's Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of…
In this note we observe that automated theorem provers (ATPs) that recursively enumerate theorems in a particular way will fail to identify some valid theorems for a reason that is analogous to how G\"odel proved the existence of what are…
The overarching theme of the following pages is that mathematical logic -- centered around the incompleteness theorems -- is first and foremost an investigation of $\textit{computation}$, not arithmetic. Guided by this intuition we will…
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…
A new viewpoint of the G\"odel's incompleteness theorem be given in this article which reveals the deep relationship between the logic and computation. Upon the results of these studies, an algorithm be given which shows how to search a…
The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem states that for every consistent sufficiently rich formal theory T there exist true statements that are unprovable in T. Such statements would be natural candidates for being added as axioms, but…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
Most discussions of G\"odel's theorems fall into one of two types: either they emphasize perceived philosophical, cultural "meanings" of the theorems, and perhaps sketch some of the ideas of the proofs, usually relating G\"odel's proofs to…
This paper discusses limitations of reflexive and diagonal arguments as methods of proof of limitative theorems (e.g. G\"odel's theorem on Entscheidungsproblem, Turing's halting problem or Chaitin-G\"odel's theorem). The fact, that a formal…
In this paper we prove Chaitin's ``heuristic principle'', {\it the theorems of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself}, for an appropriate measure of complexity. We show that the measure is…
This work is motivated by the problem of finding the limit of the applicability of the first incompleteness theorem ($\sf G1$). A natural question is: can we find a minimal theory for which $\sf G1$ holds? We examine the Turing degree…