相关论文: Learning Stationary Correlated Equilibria in Const…
We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical…
In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…
This paper investigates the supervised learning problem with observations drawn from certain general stationary stochastic processes. Here by \emph{general}, we mean that many stationary stochastic processes can be included. We show that…
In this article, we study a discounted stochastic game to model resource optimal intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. To address the problem of uncertainties in various network parameters, we propose a globalized robust game…
We study the repeated congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources, and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the following question: given a model of…
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player…
We analyze the problem of distributed power allocation for orthogonal multiple access channels by considering a continuous non-cooperative game whose strategy space represents the users' distribution of transmission power over the network's…
We present a general framework for solving a large class of learning problems with non-linear functions of classification rates. This includes problems where one wishes to optimize a non-decomposable performance metric such as the F-measure…
We show that equilibria of a sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic game (SSNG) can be adopted by players in corresponding large but finite dynamic games to achieve near-equilibrium payoffs. Such equilibria in the form of random…
In this paper, we explore aggregative games over networks of multi-integrator agents with coupled constraints. To reach the general Nash equilibrium of an aggregative game, a distributed strategy-updating rule is proposed by a combination…
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem,…
In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…
Multi-agent learning algorithms have been shown to display complex, unstable behaviours in a wide array of games. In fact, previous works indicate that convergent behaviours are less likely to occur as the total number of agents increases.…
In this paper, we solve the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in merely monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous semi-decentralized solution algorithm without projections that uses first-order information…
The $Q$-learning algorithm is a simple and widely-used stochastic approximation scheme for reinforcement learning, but the basic protocol can exhibit instability in conjunction with function approximation. Such instability can be observed…
This work proposes an algorithm for seeking generalised feedback Nash equilibria (GFNE) in noncooperative dynamic games. The focus is on cyber-physical systems with dynamics which are linear, stochastic, potentially unstable, and partially…
Despite the great empirical success of deep reinforcement learning, its theoretical foundation is less well understood. In this work, we make the first attempt to theoretically understand the deep Q-network (DQN) algorithm (Mnih et al.,…
In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider…
We consider a nonzero-sum Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The goal of each player is to maximize his respective discounted payoff function under the condition that some constraints on a…
We consider policy gradient algorithms for the indefinite least squares stationary optimal control, e.g., linear-quadratic-regulator (LQR) with indefinite state and input penalization matrices. Such a setup has important applications in…