相关论文: Strategy-Proof Facility Location for Concave Cost …

We study deterministic mechanisms for the two-facility location problem. Given the reported locations of n agents on the real line, such a mechanism specifies where to build the two facilities. The single-facility variant of this problem…

The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design \cite{NR99}. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning $m$ tasks to $n$ machines for execution. Machines are…

Algorithms with predictions have attracted much attention in the last years across various domains, including variants of facility location, as a way to surpass traditional worst-case analyses. We study the $k$-facility location mechanism…

The recent large scale availability of mobility data, which captures individual mobility patterns, poses novel operational problems that are exciting and challenging. Motivated by this, we introduce and study a variant of the…

We consider the {\em mobile facility location} (\mfl) problem. We are given a set of facilities and clients located in a common metric space. The goal is to move each facility from its initial location to a destination and assign each…

We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost…

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…

This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by…

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…

We revisit the discrete heterogeneous two-facility location problem, in which there is a set of agents that occupy nodes of a line graph, and have private approval preferences over two facilities. When the facilities are located at some…

In Facility Location problems there are agents that should be connected to facilities and locations where facilities may be opened so that agents can connect to them. We depart from Uncapacitated Facility Location and by assuming that the…

We present a randomized distributed approximation algorithm for the metric uncapacitated facility location problem. The algorithm is executed on a bipartite graph in the Congest model yielding a (1.861 + epsilon) approximation factor, where…

We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. As a natural…

In this paper, we investigate the $k$-Facility Location Problem ($k$-FLP) within the Bayesian Mechanism Design framework, in which agents' preferences are samples of a probability distributed on a line. Our primary contribution is…

This paper investigates mechanism design for congested facility location problems, where agents are partitioned into groups with conflicting interests (e.g., competition for booking a basketball court in a gymnasium), and each agent's cost…

We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions. In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean preferences, defined by their ideal points, for a facility to be located in $\mathbb{R}^2$. We show that for the…

We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…

Large scale multiagent systems must rely on distributed decision making, as centralized coordination is either impractical or impossible. Recent works approach this problem under a game theoretic lens, whereby utility functions are assigned…

We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…

The $k$-Facility Location problem is a generalization of the classical problems $k$-Median and Facility Location. The goal is to select a subset of at most $k$ facilities that minimizes the total cost of opened facilities and established…