相关论文: False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games i…

We show that the maximum success probability of players sharing quantum entanglement in a two-player game with classical questions of logarithmic length and classical answers of constant length is NP-hard to approximate to within constant…

We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by several clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote…

This paper provides a serious attempt towards constructing a switching-algebraic theory for weighted monotone voting systems, whether they are scalar-weighted or vector-weighted. The paper concentrates on the computation of a prominent…

A simple game $(N,v)$ is given by a set $N$ of $n$ players and a partition of~$2^N$ into a set~$\mathcal{L}$ of losing coalitions~$L$ with value $v(L)=0$ that is closed under taking subsets and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of winning coalitions $W$…

Most of the computational study of election problems has assumed that each voter's preferences are, or should be extended to, a total order. However in practice voters may have preferences with ties. We study the complexity of manipulative…

Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…

In probabilistic game structures, probabilistic alternating simulation (PA-simulation) relations preserve formulas defined in probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with respect to the behaviour of a subset of players. We propose a…

Gerrymandering is a practice of manipulating district boundaries and locations in order to achieve a political advantage for a particular party. Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein [AAMAS 2017] initiated the algorithmic study of a…

We propose the study of computing the Shapley value for a new class of cooperative games that we call budgeted games, and investigate in particular knapsack budgeted games, a version modeled after the classical knapsack problem. In these…

This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

Abstract Like electoral systems, decision-making methods are also vulnerable to manipulation by decision-makers. The ability to effectively defend against such threats can only come from thoroughly understanding the manipulation mechanisms.…

Algorithmic graph theory has thoroughly analyzed how, given a network describing constraints between various nodes, groups can be formed among these so that the resulting configuration optimizes a \emph{global} metric. In contrast, for…

We show that, by using multiplicative weights in a game-theoretic thought experiment (and an important convexity result on the composition of multiplicative weights with the relative entropy function), a symmetric bimatrix game (that is, a…

In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer-Mart\'inez power index (Colomer and Mart\'inez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41-63, 1995). Furthermore, we…

We examine a naming game on an adaptive weighted network. A weight of connection for a given pair of agents depends on their communication success rate and determines the probability with which the agents communicate. In some cases,…

Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to…

The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in…

We consider one-round games between a classical referee and two players. One of the main questions in this area is the parallel repetition question: Is there a way to decrease the maximum winning probability of a game without increasing the…

Schulze's rule is used in the elections of a large number of organizations including Wikimedia and Debian. Part of the reason for its popularity is the large number of axiomatic properties, like monotonicity and Condorcet consistency, which…