相关论文: False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal

We study probabilistic single-item second-price auctions where the item is characterized by a set of attributes. The auctioneer knows the actual instantiation of all the attributes, but he may choose to reveal only a subset of these…

The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if…

We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions (FPAs), where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss. This setup reflects practical scenarios in online display advertising where the…

Recent research has revealed that natural language processing (NLP) models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. However, the current techniques for generating such examples rely on deterministic heuristic rules, which fail to produce…

We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…

Model-free knockoffs is a recently proposed technique for identifying covariates that is likely to have an effect on a response variable. The method is an efficient method to control the false discovery rate in hypothesis tests for separate…

What if you could really revoke your actual biometric identity, and install a new one, by live rewriting your biological self? We propose some novel mechanisms for hot swapping identity based in novel biotechnology. We discuss the potential…

In a context of multiple hypothesis testing, we provide several new exact calculations related to the false discovery proportion (FDP) of step-up and step-down procedures. For step-up procedures, we show that the number of erroneous…

This paper investigates the strategic implications of the uniform rank-minimizing mechanism (URM), an assignment rule that selects uniformly from the set of deterministic assignments minimizing the sum of agents' reported ranks. We focus on…

Online information ecosystems are now central to our everyday social interactions. Of the many opportunities and challenges this presents, the capacity for artificial agents to shape individual and collective human decision-making in such…

Most decision-making models, including the pairwise comparison method, assume the decision-makers honesty. However, it is easy to imagine a situation where a decision-maker tries to manipulate the ranking results. This paper presents three…

We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping…

This paper studies how insurers can chose which claims to investigate for fraud. Given a prediction model, typically only claims with the highest predicted propability of being fraudulent are investigated. We argue that this can lead to…

We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who…

In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their ads. This…

De Montjoye et al. claimed that most individuals can be reidentified from a deidentified transaction database and that anonymization mechanisms are not effective against reidentification. We demonstrate that anonymization can be performed…

Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…

We produce an algorithm that, given $\phi\in Out(F_N)$, where $N\ge 2$, decides wether or not $\phi$ is an iwip ("fully irreducible") automorphism.

Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…