相关论文: False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal

In real world systems, the predictions of deployed Machine Learned models affect the training data available to build subsequent models. This introduces a bias in the training data that needs to be addressed. Existing solutions to this…

In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an…

We present a new approach to machine learning-powered combinatorial auctions, which is based on the principles of Differential Privacy. Our methodology guarantees that the auction mechanism is truthful, meaning that rational bidders have…

We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…

Fraud has severely detrimental impacts on the business of social networks and other online applications. A user can become a fake celebrity by purchasing "zombie followers" on Twitter. A merchant can boost his reputation through fake…

Deception is a fundamental issue across a diverse array of settings, from cybersecurity, where decoys (e.g., honeypots) are an important tool, to politics that can feature politically motivated "leaks" and fake news about candidates.Typical…

The minimization of specific cases in binary classification, such as false negatives or false positives, grows increasingly important as humans begin to implement more machine learning into current products. While there are a few methods to…

We show that while anonymization effectively obscures firm identity, it significantly reduces the power of textual understanding, thereby diminishing models' ability to extract meaningful economic signals from financial texts. This…

The problem of inferring the binomial parameter p from x successes obtained in n trials is reviewed and extended to take into account the presence of background, that can affect the data in two ways: a) fake successes are due to a…

Empirical investigations into unintended model behavior often show that the algorithm is predicting another outcome than what was intended. These exposes highlight the need to identify when algorithms predict unintended quantities - ideally…

Income verification is the problem of validating a person's stated income given basic identity information such as name, location, job title and employer. It is widely used in the context of mortgage lending, rental applications and other…

We provide a unifying way to analyze how risk aversion changes bidding in auctions by asking which bids become more attractive as bidders become more risk averse. In first-price auctions, under two payoff conditions--winning is never worse…

We examine ``tournament'' second-price auctions in which $N$ bidders compete for the right to participate in a second stage and contend against bidder $N+1$. When the first $N$ bidders are committed so that their bids cannot be changed in…

In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the…

The act of bluffing confounds game designers to this day. The very nature of bluffing is even open for debate, adding further complication to the process of creating intelligent virtual players that can bluff, and hence play, realistically.…

In this paper, we study the probability of successful deception of an uncompressed biometric authentication system with side information at the adversary. It represents the scenario where the adversary may have correlated side information,…

In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR…

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…

Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for…

In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for…