相关论文: Learning the Structure and Parameters of Large-Pop…

We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the…

We analyze the sample complexity of learning graphical games from purely behavioral data. We assume that we can only observe the players' joint actions and not their payoffs. We analyze the sufficient and necessary number of samples for the…

In this paper we obtain sufficient and necessary conditions on the number of samples required for exact recovery of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set of a graphical game from noisy observations of joint actions. We consider…

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? How do they perform compared…

This paper considers the challenging tasks of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) under partial observability, where each agent only sees her own individual observations and actions that reveal incomplete information about the…

Coalitions naturally exist in many real-world systems involving multiple decision makers such as ridesharing, security, and online ad auctions, but the coalition structure among the agents is often unknown. We propose and study an important…

Nearly all simulation-based games have environment parameters that affect incentives in the interaction but are not explicitly incorporated into the game model. To understand the impact of these parameters on strategic incentives, typical…

In this paper we study the problem of exact recovery of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set of a graphical game from noisy observations of joint actions of the players alone. We consider sparse linear influence games --- a…

Interactive Fiction games (IF games) are where players interact through natural language commands. While recent advances in Artificial Intelligence agents have reignited interest in IF games as a domain for studying decision-making,…

Strategic decision-making involves interactive reasoning where agents adapt their choices in response to others, yet existing evaluations of large language models (LLMs) often emphasize Nash Equilibrium (NE) approximation, overlooking the…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…

We present the Social Influence Game (SIG), a framework for modeling adversarial persuasion in social networks with an arbitrary number of competing players. Our goal is to provide a tractable and interpretable model of contested influence…

Decision making in modern large-scale and complex systems such as communication networks, smart electricity grids, and cyber-physical systems motivate novel game-theoretic approaches. This paper investigates big strategic (non-cooperative)…

In multi-agent tasks, the central challenge lies in the dynamic adaptation of strategies. However, directly conditioning on opponents' strategies is intractable in the prevalent deep reinforcement learning paradigm due to a fundamental…

A central problem in the theory of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is to understand what structural conditions and algorithmic principles lead to sample-efficient learning guarantees, and how these considerations change as we move…

We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…

Large language models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning tasks such as mathematics and coding, yet they frequently struggle with simple interactive tasks that young children perform effortlessly. This discrepancy highlights a critical gap…

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as agents in strategic decision environments, yet their behavior in structured geopolitical simulations remains under-researched. We evaluate six popular state-of-the-art LLMs alongside…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation, yet existing research has mostly evaluated their adherence to…