相关论文: The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Coo…

When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player…

The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is…

We introduce a mathematical model that combines the concepts of complex contagion with payoff-biased imitation, to describe how social behaviors spread through a population. Traditional models of social learning by imitation are based on…

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain…

Cooperation is the foundation of ecosystems and the human society, and the reinforcement learning provides crucial insight into the mechanism for its emergence. However, most previous work has mostly focused on the self-organization at the…

The study of the evolution of cooperative behaviours --which provide benefits to others-- and altruism --which provides benefits to others at a cost to oneself-- has been on the core of the evolutionary game theoretical framework since its…

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem for evolutionary biology because cooperation is undermined by selfish cheaters (or "free riders") that profit from cooperators but do not invest any resources themselves. In a purely…

Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, social interaction could change the relationship of people. And the changing social structure will affect the people's strategy too. We build…

According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines…

We consider a group of agents on a graph who repeatedly play the prisoner's dilemma game against their neighbors. The players adapt their actions to the past behavior of their opponents by applying the win-stay lose-shift strategy. On a…

The emergence and promotion of cooperation are two of the main issues in evolutionary game theory, as cooperation is amenable to exploitation by defectors, which take advantage of cooperative individuals at no cost, dooming them to…

We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time horizon, within which a strategy can recall the…

In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…

Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…

We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…

Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in…

Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect…

Two cases of evolutionary stable strategy with periodic payoffs are studied. The first is a generalization of Uyttendaele et al. The second is prisoner's dilemma with periodic payoff. It is shown that reducing the defection payoff by a…

The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will…