相关论文: Signalling Competition and Social Welfare (Working…

Shelf design decisions strongly influence product demand. In particular, placing products in desirable locations increases demand. This primary effect on shelf position is clear, but there is a secondary effect based on the relative…

We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a…

A Stackelberg duopoly model in which two firms compete to maximize their market share is considered. The firms offer a service/product to customers that are spread over several geographical regions (e.g., countries, provinces, or states).…

Can competition among misaligned AI providers yield aligned outcomes for a diverse population of users, and what role does model personalization play? We study a setting where multiple competing AI providers interact with multiple users who…

We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design, where the goal of the contest designers is to maximize the contestants' sum of efforts. Our main result shows…

We study the problem of auction design for advertising platforms that face strategic advertisers who are bidding across platforms. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize their total value or conversions while satisfying some constraint(s)…

We introduce pricing formulas for competition and collusion models of two-sided markets with an outside option. For the competition model, we find conditions under which prices and consumer surplus may increase or decrease if the outside…

Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and…

A seller with one unit of a good faces N\geq3 buyers and a single competitor who sells one other identical unit in a second-price auction with a reserve price. Buyers who do not get the seller's good will compete in the competitor's…

I characterize the consumer-optimal market segmentation in competitive markets where multiple firms selling differentiated products to consumers with unit demand. This segmentation is public---in that each firm observes the same market…

We examine trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions. Our metrics are the revenue for the utility of the auctioneer, the number of clicks for the utility of the users and the welfare for the utility of the advertisers. We show how to…

We study competition between firms that contract with consumers before the consumers fully learn their product preferences. In a Hotelling duopoly, firms screen consumers by offering menus of option contracts. We characterize the unique…

Motivated by the prevalence of prediction problems in the economy, we study markets in which firms sell models to a consumer to help improve their prediction. Firms decide whether to enter, choose models to train on their data, and set…

One of the main objectives of data mining is to help companies determine to which potential customers to market and how many resources to allocate to these potential customers. Most previous works on competitive influence in social networks…

We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…

This paper examines an adverse selection environment where a sender with private information (high or low ability) tries to convince a receiver of having higher ability. Without commitment or costly signaling, market failure can occur.…

This paper examines competitive information disclosure in search markets with a mix of savvy consumers, who search costlessly, and inexperienced consumers, who face positive search costs. Savvy consumers incentivize truthful disclosure;…

We study how a monopolist's use of consumer data for price discrimination affects welfare. To answer this question, we develop a model of market segmentation subject to residual uncertainty. We fully characterize when data usage…

This paper examines how data inputs shape competition among artificial intelligences (AIs) in pricing games. The dataset assigns labels to consumers and divides them into different markets, thereby inducing multimarket contact among AIs. We…

When designing product rankings, online retailers and platforms choose which outcome to maximize: revenues from commissions or markups, the number of transactions, or consumer welfare. These objectives need not align, creating potential…