相关论文: On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium…

We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is to match every agent to a single item so as to maximize the…

The paper studies information markets concerning single events from an epistemic social choice perspective. Within the classical Condorcet error model for collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections and…

In a Walrasian equilibrium (WE), all bidders are envy-free (EF), meaning that their allocation maximizes their utility; and the market clears (MC), meaning that the price of unallocated goods is zero. EF is desirable to ensure the long-term…

In this note, we establish a compact law of the iterated logarithm under the upper capacity for independent and identically distributed random variables in a sub-linear expectation space. For showing the result, a self-normalized law of the…

Quantum cognition in decision-making is a recent and rapidely growing field. In this paper we develop an expected utility theory in a context of non-classical (quantum) uncertainty. We replace the classical state space with a Hilbert space…

We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…

We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to…

We find that Polyakov lines, computed in abelian-projected SU(2) lattice gauge theory in the confined phase, have finite expectation values for lines corresponding to two units of the abelian electric charge. This means that the…

A model for decision making that generalizes Expected Utility Maximization is presented. This model, Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization, encompasses the Maximin criterion. It relaxes both the Independence and the Continuity…

To what extent can an external observer observing an equilibrium action distribution in an incomplete information game infer the underlying information structure? We investigate this issue in a general linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework. A…

Using results from neurobiology on perceptual decision making and value-based decision making, the problem of decision making between lotteries is reformulated in an abstract space where uncertain prospects are mapped to corresponding…

This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate…

Consider a barter exchange problem over a finite set of agents, where each agent owns an item and is also associated with a (privately known) wish list of items belonging to the other agents. An outcome of the problem is a (re)allocation of…

The core is a central concept in multi-winner social choice, ensuring that no coalition of voters can support an alternative outcome whose size or cost exceeds the group's share of the electorate. This idea originates from the Lindahl…

We study the online allocation of divisible items to $n$ agents with additive valuations for $p$-mean welfare maximization, a problem introduced by Barman, Khan, and Maiti~(2022). Our algorithmic and hardness results characterize the…

There are several aspects of data markets that distinguish them from a typical commodity market: asymmetric information, the non-rivalrous nature of data, and informational externalities. Formally, this gives rise to a new class of games…

We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…

We have shown that entanglement assisted stochastic strategies allow access to strategic measures beyond the classically correlated measures accessible through passive common randomness, and thus attain a quantum advantage in decentralised…