相关论文: Nash Equilibria via Duality and Homological Select…

We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…

This paper studies generalized Nash equilibrium problems that are given by rational functions. The optimization problems are not assumed to be convex. Rational expressions for Lagrange multipliers and feasible extensions of KKT points are…

Cournot competition is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility---a function of the production cost as well as market price of the…

We investigate some relations between the duality and the topological filtration in algebraic K-theory. As a result, we obtain a construction of the first Steenrod square for Chow groups modulo two of varieties over a field of arbitrary…

In this paper, we consider a Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a class of high-order multi-agent systems with unknown dynamics. Different from existing results for single integrators, we aim to steer the outputs of this class of…

The purpose of this paper is to develop a numerical method for finding an equilibrium point in a model, in which the loss function of each object (subject) is described by a convex function with respect to one of its variables. Such models…

This paper investigates the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for two-network zero-sum games with set constraints, where the two networks have the opposite nonsmooth cost functions. The interaction of the agents in each network…

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…

Model-free learning for multi-agent stochastic games is an active area of research. Existing reinforcement learning algorithms, however, are often restricted to zero-sum games, and are applicable only in small state-action spaces or other…

People choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. The process can be modelled as an evolutionary game dynamics system, which may be…

Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by…

Agents attempt to maximize expected profits earned by selling multiple units of a perishable product where their revenue streams are affected by the prices they quote as well as the distribution of other prices quoted in the market by other…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

To optimally select a generalized Nash equilibrium, in this paper, we propose a semi-decentralized algorithm based on a double-layer Tikhonov regularization method. Technically, we extend the Tikhonov method for equilibrium selection in…

In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in strongly monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous-time solution algorithm that uses regular projections and first-order information. As…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

We address the Nash equilibrium problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only observe the actions of some neighbors, while its cost possibly depends on the strategies of other agents. Our main contribution is…

Nonlinear tranlational symmetric equilibria with up to quartic flux terms in the free functions, reversed magnetic shear and sheared flow are constructed in two ways: i) quasianalytically by an ansatz which reduces the pertinent generalized…

We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and…

We consider Nash-Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium models involving separable concave cost functions. In contrast to the models with linear and convex cost functions, in these models a local equilibrium point may not be a global one. We…