相关论文: Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spac…
Convex geometries are closure systems satisfying the anti-exchange axiom. Every finite convex geometry can be embedded into a convex geometry of finitely many points in an n-dimensional space equipped with a convex hull operator, by the…
The curse of dimensionality in the realm of association rules is twofold. Firstly, we have the well known exponential increase in computational complexity with increasing item set size. Secondly, there is a \emph{related curse} concerned…
We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem--a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with…
We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains from which agents' values come from -- can capture arbitrarily…
Let $D$ and $E$ be subspaces of the tensor product of the $m$ and $n$ dimensional complex spaces, with codimensions $k$ and \ell$, respectively. We show that if $k+\ell<m+n-2$ then there must exist a product vector in $D$ whose partial…
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical,…
We study a generic principal-agent problem in continuous time on a finite time horizon. We introduce a framework in which the agent is allowed to employ measure-valued controls and characterise the continuation utility as a solution to a…
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known…
This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional…
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…
Maximizing the revenue from selling _more than one_ good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as…
The generalized Busemann-Petty problem asks whether centrally-symmetric convex bodies having larger volume of all m-dimensional sections necessarily have larger volume. When m>3 this is known to be false, but the cases m=2,3 are still open.…
We prove that the existence of best coapproximation to any element of the normed linear space out of any one dimensional subspace and its coincidence with the best approximation to that element out of that subspace characterizes a real…
A principal screens an agent with an arbitrary set of allocations $X$. The agent's preferences over allocations are comonotonic. A subset of allocations $X^*\subseteq X$ is a surplus-elasticity frontier if (i) any other allocation has a…
We show that two-dimensional convection-diffusion problems with a radial sink or source at the origin may be recast as a pure diffusion problem in a fictitious space in which the spatial dimension is continuously-tunable with the Peclet…
The paper concerns the study of new classes of nonlinear and nonconvex optimization problems of the so-called infinite programming that are generally defined on infinite-dimensional spaces of decision variables and contain infinitely many…
We consider the problem of a firm seeking to use personalized pricing to sell an exogenously given stock of a product over a finite selling horizon to different consumer types. We assume that the type of an arriving consumer can be observed…
In this work, we present a new efficient method for convex shape representation, which is regardless of the dimension of the concerned objects, using level-set approaches. Convexity prior is very useful for object completion in computer…
Cutting and packing problems are present in many, at first glance unconnected, areas, therefore it's beneficial to have a good understanding of their underlying structure, to select proper techniques for finding solutions. Cutting and…