相关论文: Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching

Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…

Mechanism design is a central research branch in microeconomics. An effective mechanism can significantly improve performance and efficiency of social decisions under desired objectives, such as to maximize social welfare or to maximize…

Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…

We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the…

In this paper we prove the efficacy of a simple greedy algorithm for a finite horizon online resource allocation/matching problem, when the corresponding static planning linear program (SPP) exhibits a non-degeneracy condition called the…

We consider the scheduling problem on $n$ strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias, Theory Comput. Syst. (2014)] where a machine…

We study the design of optimal allocation mechanisms in an environment where agents and goods arrive stochastically. Agents have private types that determine the principal payoff. Either agents or goods can be held in a queue at a flow cost…

Submodular maximization has been a central topic in theoretical computer science and combinatorial optimization over the last decades. Plenty of well-performed approximation algorithms have been designed for the problem over a variety of…

Knapsack problem (KP) is a representative combinatorial optimization problem that aims to maximize the total profit by selecting a subset of items under given constraints on the total weights. In this study, we analyze a generalized version…

We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…

We study a robust extensible bin packing problem with budgeted uncertainty, under a budgeted uncertainty model where item sizes are defined to lie in the intersection of a box with a one-norm ball. We propose a scenario generation algorithm…

We study a natural generalization of stable matching to the maximum weight stable matching problem and we obtain a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for it by reducing it to the problem of finding a maximum weight ideal cut in a DAG.…

The structure of many real-world optimization problems includes minimization of a nonlinear (or quadratic) functional subject to bound and singly linear constraints (in the form of either equality or bilateral inequality) which are commonly…

We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…

In this paper, we study the possibility of designing non-trivial random CSP models by exploiting the intrinsic connection between structures and typical-case hardness. We show that constraint consistency, a notion that has been developed to…

We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…

We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…

In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable constraints, giving only second-order consideration to the…

Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the problem of designing truthful budget feasible mechanisms for…

Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…