相关论文: Benchmark Problems for Totally Unimodular Set Syst…

We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…

We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price…

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…

We study a participatory budgeting problem of aggregating the preferences of agents and dividing a budget over the projects. A budget division solution is a probability distribution over the projects. The main purpose of our study concerns…

From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to…

This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the…

We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such…

Previous works suggested the use of Branch and Bound techniques for finding the optimal allocation in (multi-unit) combinatorial auctions. They remarked that Linear Programming could provide a good upper-bound to the optimal allocation, but…

Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…

In this paper, we present a general framework for efficiently computing diverse solutions to combinatorial optimization problems. Given a problem instance, the goal is to find $k$ solutions that maximize a specified diversity measure; the…

We study the knapsack problem with group fairness constraints. The input of the problem consists of a knapsack of bounded capacity and a set of items, each item belongs to a particular category and has and associated weight and value. The…

Inspired by the recent developments in the field of Spectrum Auctions, we have tried to provide a comprehensive framework for the complete procedure of Spectrum Licensing. We have identified the various issues the Governments need to decide…

Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…

In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…

Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…

We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides $m^{\frac 1 2 -\epsilon}$ approximation to the social welfare and uses value queries only must use…

The majority of online marketplaces offer promotion programs to sellers to acquire additional customers for their products. These programs typically allow sellers to allocate advertising budgets to promote their products, with higher…

Contemporary recommender systems act as intermediaries on multi-sided platforms serving high utility recommendations from sellers to buyers. Such systems attempt to balance the objectives of multiple stakeholders including sellers, buyers,…

The need of totally secure online auction has led to the invention of many auction protocols. But as new attacks are developed, auction protocols also require corresponding strengthening. We analyze the auction protocol based on the…

Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…