Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders
Computer Science and Game Theory
2012-12-13 v1
Abstract
We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously near-optimal in a wide range of Bayesian multi-unit environments.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1212.2825,
title = {Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders},
author = {Elias Koutsoupias and Stefano Leonardi and Tim Roughgarden},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1212.2825},
year = {2012}
}