相关论文: Reciprocating Preferences Stablize Matching: Colle…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We consider the stability of matchings when individuals strategically submit preference information to a publicly known algorithm. Most pure Nash equilibria of the ensuing game yield a matching that is unstable with respect to the…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching problems under a novel type of distributional constraints, resource-regional caps. In the context of college admissions, under resource-regional caps, an admitted student may be provided with a unit…
Universities regularly face the challenging task of assigning classes to thousands of students while considering their preferences, along with course schedules and capacities. Ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of course allocation…
In this paper, we consider the communication complexity of protocols that compute stable matchings. We work within the context of Gale and Shapley's original stable marriage problem\cite{GS62}: $n$ men and $n$ women each privately hold a…
Real-life applications of deferred-acceptance (DA) matching algorithms sometimes exhibit errors or changes to the matching inputs that are discovered only after the algorithm has been run and the results are announced to participants.…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
We study group fairness in the context of feedback loops induced by meritocratic selection into programs that themselves confer additional advantage, like college admissions. We introduce a stylized, yet novel inter-generational model for…
The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is a popular school allocation mechanism thanks to its strategy proofness. However, with application costs, strategy proofness fails, leading to an identification problem. In this paper, I address this…
We study the tiered deferred acceptance mechanism used in school admissions, such as in China and Turkey. This mechanism partitions schools into tiers and applies the deferred acceptance algorithm within each tier. Once assigned, students…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with $n$ doctors and $n$ hospitals, the…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
Information frictions can harm the welfare of participants in two-sided matching markets. Consider a centralized admission, where colleges cannot observe students' preparedness for success in a particular major or degree program. Colleges…
This paper considers the stability of online learning algorithms and its implications for learnability (bounded regret). We introduce a novel quantity called {\em forward regret} that intuitively measures how good an online learning…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
Inferring applicant preferences is fundamental in many analyses of school-choice data. Application mistakes make this task challenging. We propose a novel approach to deal with the mistakes in a deferred-acceptance matching environment. The…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…
This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without…
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take $\Theta(n^2)$ steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only $\Theta(n \log n)$ steps in the average case (with $n$ women and $n$ men). In 1976, Knuth…