相关论文: Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods…

Cooperation and defection may be considered as two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means…

Cooperation in evolutionary biology means paying a cost, c, to enjoy benefits, b. A defector is one who does not pay any cost but enjoys the benefits of cooperators. Human societies, especially, have evolved a strategy to discourage…

Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…

Enforcing cooperation among substantial agents is one of the main objectives for multi-agent systems. However, due to the existence of inherent social dilemmas in many scenarios, the free-rider problem may arise during agents' long-run…

Understanding the emergence of cooperation is a central issue in evolutionary game theory. The hardest setup for the attainment of cooperation in a population of individuals is the Public Goods game in which cooperative agents generate a…

Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in…

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…

Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bare additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and…

We have studied the evolution of strategies in spatial public goods games where both individual (peer) and institutional (pool) punishments are present beside unconditional defector and cooperator strategies. The evolution of strategy…

In a community-structured population, public goods games (PGG) occur both within and between communities. Such type of PGG is referred as multilevel public goods games (MPGG). We propose a minimalist evolutionary model of the MPGG and…

The dilemma in cooperation is one of the major concerns in game theory. In a public-goods game, each individual pays a cost for cooperation, or to prevent defection, and receives a reward from the collected cost in a group. Thus, defection…

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or…

In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in every available groups and the mutual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group formation of players…

Pro-social punishment and exclusion are common means to elevate the level of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the combined use of these two strategies is quite common across human societies.…

Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility…

Understanding how cooperation emerges in public goods games is crucial for addressing societal challenges. While optional participation can establish cooperation without identifying cooperators, it relies on specific assumptions -- that…

The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…

According to the standard protocol of spatial public goods game, a cooperator player invests not only into his own game but also into the games organized by neighboring partners. In this work, we relax this assumption by allowing…

Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…