相关论文: The norm game on a model network: a critical line

Asymmetric evolutionary games, such as the Ultimatum Game, provide keys to understanding the emergence of fairness in social species. Building on this framework, we explore the evolution of social value systems and the operational role that…

The Stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already widely adopted and stable due to deviants' sanctions. Thus, how does a population…

We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against "defectors", or alternatively, significantly rewarding "cooperators", theoretical models typically predict a system…

This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…

The notion of innocent strategy was introduced by Hyland and Ong in order to capture the interactive behaviour of lambda-terms and PCF programs. An innocent strategy is defined as an alternating strategy with partial memory, in which the…

We study the evolution of cooperation in populations where individuals play prisoner's dilemma on a network. Every node of the network corresponds on an individual choosing whether to cooperate or defect in a repeated game. The players…

Concurrent multi-player games with $\omega$-regular objectives are a standard model for systems that consist of several interacting components, each with its own objective. The standard solution concept for such games is Nash Equilibrium,…

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

The Competing Bandits framework is a recently emerging area that integrates multi-armed bandits in online learning with stable matching in game theory. While conventional models assume that all players and arms are constantly available, in…

This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…

A large body of empirical evidence suggests that humans are willing to engage in costly punishment of defectors in public goods games. Based on such pieces of evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting…

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…

Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model in a dynamical directed network. We analytically obtain the degree distribution…

Classical game theory is a powerful framework to analyze the strategic interactions among rational players. However, in many real-life scenarios, players choose actions based on their inherent natural tendencies rather than deliberate…

Machine learning relies on the assumption that unseen test instances of a classification problem follow the same distribution as observed training data. However, this principle can break down when machine learning is used to make important…

In this paper we study social exclusion in social (information) networks using a game-theoretic approach, and study the stability of a certain class community structures that are a Nash equilibrium. The main result of our analysis shows…

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…

We consider a model of power distribution in a social system where a set of agents play a simple game on a graph: the probability of winning each round is proportional to the agent's current power, and the winner gets more power as a…

I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players endogenously decide whether to disclose signals about their past actions. I establish an-anti folk theorem, that when players are sufficiently long-lived, they will almost…

In many real-world scenarios, it is nearly impossible to collect explicit social network data. In such cases, whole networks must be inferred from underlying observations. Here, we formulate the problem of inferring latent social networks…