相关论文: Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's…

Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if, for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour accordingly to…

The prisoner's dilemma describes a conflict between a pair of players, in which defection is a dominant strategy whereas cooperation is collectively optimal. The iterated version of the dilemma has been extensively studied to understand the…

Reciprocity is an important feature of human social interaction and underpins our cooperative nature. What is more, simple forms of reciprocity have proved remarkably resilient in matrix game social dilemmas. Most famously, the tit-for-tat…

Evolutionary game theory has been an important tool for describing economic and social behaviour for decades. Approximate mean value equations describing the time evolution of strategy concentrations can be derived from the players'…

We explore some strategies which tend to perform well in the IPD. We start off by showing the significance of Tit-For-Tat strategies in evolutionary game theory. This is followed by a theoretical derivation of zero-determinant strategies,…

The emergence of mutual cooperation is studied in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in which the players are located on the sites of cubic lattices for dimensions d=1, 2, and 3. Each player can choose one of the…

We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the…

The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…

One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of…

Researchers have explored the performance of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies for decades, from the celebrated performance of Tit for Tat to the introduction of the zero-determinant strategies and the use of sophisticated learning…

Human social life is shaped by repeated interactions, where past experiences guide future behavior. In evolutionary game theory, a key challenge is to identify strategies that harness such memory to succeed in repeated encounters. Decades…

Cooperating first then mimicking the partner's act has been proven to be effective in utilizing reciprocity in social dilemmas. However, the extent to which this, called Tit-for-Tat strategy, should be regarded as equivalent to…

Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…

Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…

Ever since Axelrod's seminal work, tournaments served as the main benchmark for evaluating strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). In this work, we first introduce a strategy for the IPD which outperforms previous tournament…

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…

This paper addresses a mathematically tractable model of the Prisoner's Dilemma using the framework of active inference. In this work, we design pairs of Bayesian agents that are tracking the joint game state of their and their opponent's…

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…