相关论文: Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting …

Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The…

Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where…

The first step in classifying the complexity of an NP problem is typically showing the problem in P or NP-complete. This has been a successful first step for many problems, including voting problems. However, in this paper we show that this…

Scoring protocols are a broad class of voting systems. Each is defined by a vector $(\alpha_1,\alpha_2,...,\alpha_m)$, $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2 \geq >... \geq \alpha_m$, of integers such that each voter contributes $\alpha_1$ points to…

Strategic voting, or manipulation, is the process by which a voter misrepresents his preferences in an attempt to elect an outcome that he considers preferable to the outcome under sincere voting. It is generally agreed that manipulation is…

Neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. Carefully chosen perturbations to real images, while imperceptible to humans, induce misclassification and threaten the reliability of deep learning systems in the wild. To…

A long line of work in social psychology has studied variations in people's susceptibility to persuasion -- the extent to which they are willing to modify their opinions on a topic. This body of literature suggests an interesting…

We study the problem of {\em impartial selection}, a topic that lies at the intersection of computational social choice and mechanism design. The goal is to select the most popular individual among a set of community members. The input can…

Traditional variable selection methods could fail to be sign consistent when irrepresentable conditions are violated. This is especially critical in high-dimensional settings when the number of predictors exceeds the sample size. In this…

This article extends the analysis of Atkinson, Foley, and Ganz in "Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked-Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?". Their work uses a one-dimensional spatial model based on survey data from…

Criteria for a good voting system have been given particularly careful scrutiny in recent years, with general agreement that the core values are fair results, voter power and choice, and local representation. This paper reexamines the basic…

We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…

Security properties are often focused on the technological side of the system. One implicitly assumes that the users will behave in the right way to preserve the property at hand. In real life, this cannot be taken for granted. In…

We focus on the strategyproofness of voting systems where voters must choose a number of options among several possibilities. These systems include those that are used for Participatory Budgeting, where we organize an election to determine…

A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control,…

The notion of strong structural controllability (s-controllability) allows for determining controllability properties of large linear time-invariant systems even when numerical values of the system parameters are not known a priori. The…

Candidate control of elections is the study of how adding or removing candidates can affect the outcome. However, the traditional study of the complexity of candidate control is in the model in which all candidates and votes are known up…

Voting rules may implement the will of the society when all eligible voters vote, and only them. However, they may fail to do so when sybil (fake or duplicate) votes are present and when only some honest (non sybil) voters actively…

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…

We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…