相关论文: A simple evolutionary game with feedback between p…

We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one of the players, the social preferences of the players, or the…

We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…

Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and…

We consider a simplified version of the Wealth Game, which is an agent-based financial market model with many interesting features resembling the real stock market. Market makers are not present in the game so that the majority traders are…

The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…

We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…

How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…

Involution now refers to the phenomenon that competitors in the same field make more efforts to struggle for limited resources but get lower individual ''profit effort ratio''. In this work, we investigate the evolution of the involution…

It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…

In the game of Matching Pennies, Alice and Bob each hold a penny, and at every tick of the clock they simultaneously display the head or the tail sides of their coins. If they both display the same side, then Alice wins Bob's penny; if they…

When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…

Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The…

"The chance to win given a certain move" is an easily obtainable quantity from data and often quoted in gaming statistics. It is also the fundamental quantity that reinforcement learning AI bases on. Unfortunately, this conditional…

Evolutionary game theory has been a successful tool to combine classical game theory with learning-dynamical descriptions in multiagent systems. Provided some symmetric structures of interacting players, many studies have been focused on…

We give elementary examples within a framework for studying decisions under uncertainty where probabilities are only roughly known. The framework, in gambling terms, is that the size of a bet is proportional to the gambler's perceived…

We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous…

We start with the well-known game below: Two players hold a sheet of paper to their forehead on which a positive integer is written. The numbers are consecutive and each player can only see the number of the other one. In each time step,…

Risk aversion is a common behavior universal to humans and animals alike. Economists have traditionally defined risk preferences by the curvature of the utility function. Psychologists and behavioral economists also make use of concepts…

Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…

In this paper, we study the distribution of the number of internal equilibria of a multi-player two-strategy random evolutionary game. Using techniques from the random polynomial theory, we obtain a closed formula for the probability that…